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THE  A  B   C'S  OF   DISARMAMENT 

AND 

THE  PACIFIC  PROBLEMS 


By 
ARTHUR  BULLARD 


The  Stranger 

A   Man's    World 

The  Barbary  Coast 

The   Diplomacy  of  the  Great   War 

Mobilizing  America.  Our  National  Prob- 
lems 

Panama,  the  Canal,  the  Country  and  the 
People 

The     Russian     Pendulum:     Autocracy — 
Democracy — Bolshivism 


The  A  B  CS  of  Disarmament 

and 
The  Pacific  Problems 


BY 

ARTHUR  BULLARD 


I15etti  ^ork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1921 

All  rights  reserved 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF   AMERICA 


Copyright,  1921, 
By  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  October,  1921, 


Press  of 

7,  J.   Littlft  &  Ives  Company 

jypiy  Kork,  U.  S.  A. 


FOREWORD 

THE   COST   OF   ARMAMENTS 

No  two  estimates  agree  on  even  the  simplest 
item  in  the  expense  of  armament  competition — the 
direct  governmental  appropriations  for  military 
purposes.  Should  the  expenses  of  Cadet  Corps  in 
the  Public  Schools  be  included?  An  exact  calcula- 
tion of  the  proportion  of  our  National  Income 
which  we  are  spending  on  the  liquidation  of  past 
wars  and  preparations  for  new  ones  is  impossible; 
the  most  impressive  estimates  vary  from  80  to 
more  than  90  per  cent. 

However,  the  budget  figures  of  the  different  na- 
tions represent  only  the  smallest  element  in  the 
Cost  of  Armaments.  Our  larger  dictionaries  give 
a  rare  word  "illth,"  which  deserves  more  usage 
than  it  gets,  for  in  its  contrast  to  the  commoner 
word  "wealth"  it  aptly  describes  a  large  part  of 
the  life  about  us.  Of  the  commodities  which  we 
produce  on  our  intricate  and  marvelous  machines, 
not  all  can  be  called  "wealth."    We  make  not  only 

Note. — Due  acknowledgment  should  be  made  to  The  Times 
for  the  courtesy  of  permission  to  reprint. 


vi  FOREWORD 

such  useless  things  as  wooden  nutmegs,  but  also 
harmful  drugs. 

No  better  illustration  of  "illth"  could  be  found 
than  munitions.  The  production  of  a  high  explo- 
sive shell  absorbs  a  great  deal  of  inventive  in- 
genuity, working  capital  and  skilled  labor.  Sup- 
pose it  rots  in  innocuous  desuetude.  All  this 
energy  which  might  have  produced  "goods"  of 
value  is  sheer  waste.  But  if  the  shell  goes  off, 
as  its  designers  planned,  it  destroys  wealth  much 
greater  than  its  cost.  So  with  our  battleships.  If 
they  gradually  rust  into  obsolescence,  that  is  the 
best  we  can  hope.  If  they  are  ever  used,  the  pro- 
duction of  illth  will  far  outrun  the  original  ex-' 
pense. 

There  is  still  another  and  vaster  indirect  cost  in 
competitive  armaments — the  undermining  of 
credit.  Any  attempt  to  estimate  the  expense  of 
preparing  for  war,  even  if  it  starts  out  with  deter- 
mination to  keep  on  a  hard-headed  dollar-and- 
cent  basis,  forces  a  consideration  of  credit  and 
immediately  you  are  in  the  deep  waters  of 
psychology,  beyond  the  bookkeeper's  power  of 
appraisement. 

More  and  more  in  the  last  few  generations 
"credit"  has  taken  the  place  of  "cash"  in  our  busi- 
ness transactions.  The  development  of  interna- 
tional finance  and  world  trade  has  brought  us  wool 
from  Australia,  flax  from  Russia,  silks  from  the 


FOREWORD  vu 

Orient  and  has  opened  markets  for  our  products 
the  world  around.  There  was  general  confidence, 
based  on  the  assumption  that  all  the  great  nations 
were  solvent.  Who  can  say  now  what  nation's 
credit  is  good?  Today  the  French  Government's 
formal  "Promise  to  pay"  twenty  cents  is  worth 
from  five  to  ten  cents.  With  the  other  nations  it 
is  merely  a  question  of  more  or  less  and  none  of 
them  can  restore  their  credit  to  par  so  long  as 
their  armament  expenses  outrun  their  income  and 
turn  each  year's  budget  into  a  deficit.  We  are 
relatively  fortunate,  because  we  have  ten  to  twenty 
cents  left  out  of  every  dollar  to  spend  on  health 
and  wealth  and  wisdom.  But  some  of  the  nations 
are  spending  more  than  their  income  on  "illth." 
The  imminence  of  bankruptcy  is  so  obvious  that 
credit  transactions,  without  which  production  and 
commerce  is  strangled,  are  impossible. 

This  psychological  factor  is  of  course  the  great- 
est itein  in  the  cost  of  competitive  armaments, 
although  it  is  harder  to  plot  on  a  graphic  chart. 
During  the  War  and  immediately  afterwards  we 
heard  a  great  deal  about  "Reconstruction,"  but  all 
the  fine  plans  were  hampered,  most  of  them  en- 
tirely thwarted,  by  the  frame  of  mind  which  these 
armaments  typify.  Progress?  Human  better- 
ment? Increased  production  of  wealth?  Credit 
is  ruined.    Capital  is  tied  up — or  lost.    We  count 


viii  FOREWORD 

up  the  unemployed  in  millions.  But  throughout 
the  world  the  armament  factories  are  busy. 

The  Medicos  have  discovered  that  Fear  upsets 
the  balance  of  the  stomach  fluids  and  stops  the 
process  of  digestion.  It  is  clear  even  to  the  lay- 
man that  Fear  arrests  the  processes  of  production 
and  exchange.  Everybody  admits  that  another 
Great  War  would  be  disastrous,  but  on  all  sides 
we  see  and  hear  the  preparations  for  it.  It  is 
aside  from  the  point  to  argue  that  war  in  the 
Far  East  is  not  inevitable.  Just  the  bare  pos- 
sibility of  it,  and  the  probability  is  frequently  dis- 
cussed in  the  press,  blocks  the  development  of  a 
profitable  Oriental  trade  a  great  deal  more  seri- 
ously than  the  burden  of  taxation  to  buy  more 
warships. 

An  accountant  can  put  down  figures  and  make 
graphic  charts  to  show  how  much  of  our  National 
Budget  is  turned  into  illth  for  war  purposes.  But 
who  can  determine  the  percentage  of  enterprise 
and  energy  that  might  be  devoted  to  the  increase 
of  our  common  wealth,  which  is  paralyzed  by 
noisy  preparations  for  war?  The  Fear  of  War 
is  infinitely  more  expensive  than  the  cost  of  arma- 
ments. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Foreword v 

CHAPTER 

I.    The  Defense  of  Vital  Interests      .         i 

II.  America's  Vital  Interests — Terri- 
torial Defense  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine lo 

III.  America's      Vital      Interests — The 

Freedom  of  the  Seas      ....      19 

IV.  America's  Vital  Interests — The  Open 

Door 33 

V.    The  Vital  Interests  of  Britain  .     .       43 

VI.    The  Vital  Interests  of  Japan — Eco- 
nomic      53 

VII.    The  Vital  Interests  of  Japan — Po- 
litical     65 

VIII.  China's  Vital  Interests     ....  74 

IX.  The  Interests  of  the  Other  Powers  83 

X.  The  Three  Zones  of  Conflict     .     .  94 

XI.  What  May  Result 103 

XII.  Diplomacy  and  Public  Opinion  .     .  113 


THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

AND 

THE  PACIFIC  PROBLEMS 


THE   A   B   CS 
OF  DISARMAMENT 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   DEFENSE   OF   VITAL   INTERESTS 

Men  always  strive  to  defend  what  seems  to  them 
precious.  This  instinct  of  private  life  dominates 
International  Relations,  but  when  diplomats  talk 
of  the  things  which  nations  hold  dear,  they  call 
them  "Vital  Interests."  This  is  an  elastic  phrase, 
but,  in  spite  of  its  frequent  abuse,  it  has  a  real 
meaning.  The  "vital  interests"  of  a  nation  are 
the  things  which  its  citizens  are  determined  to 
defend — even  at  the  cost  of  war. 

Civilized  man  is  just  as  intent  as  the  savage  on 
safeguarding  his  precious  possessions;  that  he 
more  rarely  resorts  to  brute  force  is  not  because 
he  is  less  intent,  but  because  he  has  found  methods 
which  are  surer.  Nations  as  well  as  individuals 
have  made  some  halting  progress  towards  civi- 
lization; they  have  invented  certain  methods  of 


2  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

agreement  for  the  protection  of  their  interests, 
which  are  cheaper  and  more  effective  than  war. 

All  will  admit  that  the  defense  of  its  territory 
from  such  devastation  as  overwhelmed  Belgium 
is  a  "vital  interest"  for  every  country.  The  face 
of  the  world  is  scarred  with  obsolete  and  aban- 
doned frontier  fortresses,  which  illustrate  the 
"natural"  method  of  defending  the  homeland 
from  invasion.  Humanity,  from  the  days  of  the 
Chinese  Wall  to  our  own  times,  when  the  suburbs 
of  Liege  were  disfigured  bj^  steel  and  concrete 
bastions,  has  spent  appalling  sums  on  such  de- 
fenses. But  we  would  not  complain  seriously  of 
the  expense.  No  price  is  too  high  for  protection. 
The  imbecility  of  these  forts  was  not  in  their  cost, 
but  in  their  futility. 

It  was  the  New  World  which  set  the  example 
in  the  "civiHzed" — as  contrasted  with  the 
"natural" — method  of  protection  from  invasion. 
There  are  few  frontiers  in  the  world  as  long  as 
that  which  separates  us  from  Canada  or  Argentine 
from  Chili.  Neither  is  fortified.  In  both  cases 
the  vital  interest  of  security  from  hostile  raids  is 
founded  on  agreement — much  greater  security 
than  any  founded  on  armament. 

The  Agreement,  which  guards  our  Northern 
Frontier,  is  more  than  a  formal  document — al- 
though a  Treaty  was  signed  at  Ghent — it  is  really 
a  habit  of  mind,  a  more  civilized  outlook  on  life. 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  VITAL  INTERESTS  3 

Back  of  it,  giving  it  more  vitality  than  the  seals 
and  signatures,  is  the  established  conviction  of 
both  peoples  that  war  would  be  a  shameful  sur- 
render to  barbarism.  We  have  our  disputes  over 
wood-pulp  and  such  like  things  but,  although  very 
few  of  us  have  read  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  we  know 
that  we  are  not  going  to  fight. 

I  remember  my  blank  amazement,  some  years 
before  the  War,  when  a  German  officer  told  me 
that  Britain  would  not  dare  to  support  France  in 
a  coniinental  war,  because  it  would  give  us  an 
opportunity  to  grab  Canada.  In  the  same  way, 
some  German  propagandists  in  this  country  tried 
to  make  us  uneasy  when  the  Canadians  began 
concentrating  forces  for  service  in  France.  How 
did  we  know  that  they  would  not  make  a  raid  on 
Boston  or  Chicago?  But  none  of  us  ever  turned 
a  hair  over  such  scare  stories.  We  trust  each 
other.  It  is  not  only  the  cheaper  and  more  civi- 
lized, but  far  and  away  the  most  effective  method 
of  defense. 

The  Canadians,  however,  would  not  have  de- 
mobilized, after  the  War,  if  they  had  suspected 
us  of  aggressive  designs,  and  there  is  nothing  in 
our  history  to  suggest  that  we  are  less  ready  to 
defend  our  interests.  This  is  the  crux  of  the 
whole  problem  of  armaments.  Men  and  nations 
will  defend  whatever  they  consider  their  vital 
interests.     If  they  cannot  do   so   by  confident 


4  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

agreement,  they  will  arm.  If  they  are  afraid  they 
will  spend  their  last  cent  buying  guns.  No  seri- 
ous reduction  in  armament  can  be  expected  unless, 

and  until,  there  is  a  reduction  in  distrust  and  fear. 

*         *         * 

The  problem  before  the  delegates  at  the  Wash- 
ington Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ments will  be  to  extend  the  zone  of  agreement 
and  decrease  the  sphere  of  distrust.  It  is  a 
matter  of  bringing  larger  areas  into  a  "state  of 
civilization,"  the  realm  of  voluntary  accords,  and 
the  reduction  of  those  areas  still  in  a  "state  of 
nature,"  where  every  man's  hand  is  against  his 
neighbor,  where  confidence  is  unknown  and  death 
comes  quickly  to  the  weak  and  unarmed. 

No  one  has  seriously  proposed  a  Superstate, 
which  could  compel  nations  to  disarm,  nor  is  there 
any  hope  of  progress  in  guile.  The  Treaty  of 
Ghent  would  long  ago  have  gone  to  the  scrap 
basket,  if  either  party  had  suspected  trickery  or 
bad  faith.  Whatever  results  come  out  of  this 
Conference  will  be  based  on  voluntary,  open-eyed 
and  loyal  agreements. 

Those  who  thought  that  the  diplomats  at  Paris 
might  contrive  a  document  which  would  usher  in 
— right  after  the  War — a  new  era  of  peace  and 
prosperity,  will  probably  be  again  disappointed 
with  the  Conference  at  Washington.  It  is  not  a 
matter  of  phraseology  nor  clever  authorship. 
Treaties  are  worthless  unless  they  register   an 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  VITAL  INTERESTS  $ 

existing  frame  of  mind.  Pledges  to  reduce  arma- 
ments, no  matter  how  bedecked  with  seals,  are 
valueless  unless  there  is  real  confidence  and  satis- 
faction back  of  them.  If  the  Conference  leaves 
any  nation  feeling  sore,  embittered,  cheated  out  of 
its  legitimate  interests,  it  will  be  a  waste  of  time 
to  read  the  formal  documents.  It  is  altogether 
too  easy  for  a  government  to  subsidize  a  mer- 
cantile airplane  service,  capable  of  bombing  a 
neighboring  capital,  or  to  introduce  into  the 
schools  a  course  in  calisthenics  suspiciously  like 
the  "goose-step."  It  is  too  easy  for  the  private 
citizen  to  erect  a  still  under  the  kitchen  stairs  to 
concoct  a  home-brew  of  poison  gas  or  high  ex- 
plosive. 

All  projects  for  reducing  armaments  fall  flat, 
unless  a  basis  is  established  for  confidence  and 
good  will.  Unless  a  nation  is  convinced  that  its 
vital  interests  are  amply  protected  by  agreement, 
unless  it  has  been  brought  voluntarily  into  such 
agreement,  it  will  arm. 

First  of  all  we  must  know  what  each  nation 
considers  its  "vital  interests."  Then  the  problem 
will  be  to  find  out  where  they  conflict  and  how 
such  conflicts  can  be  accommodated.  ■  Each  na- 
tion must  be  shown  that  its  own  interests  are 
more  surely  protected  by  the  civilized  method  of 
agreement  than  by  the  old-fashioned  "natural" 
method  of  armament. 

The  fitting  of  the  various  interests  of  half  a 


6  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

dozen  nations  into  a  coherent  design  will  prove 
considerably  more  difficult  than  a  jig-saw  puzzle. 

=i<  *  >K 

However,  to  say  that  the  task  before  the  Con- 
ference at  Washington  is  difficult  is  not  to  suggest 
that  it  is  impossible.  There  is  ground  for  large 
hopes  of  real  achievements.  Much  progress  has 
already  been  made  in  the  substituting  of  agree- 
ment for  armament — and  not  only  on  this  hemi- 
sphere. 

Perhaps  the  change  in  the  British  attitude  to- 
wards their  Navy  is  the  most  striking  and  hopeful 
illustration.  A  few  decades  ago  the  English 
relied  solely  on  their  own  Fleet  for  the  defense 
of  their  large  and  vital  interests  at  sea.  They 
built  a  Navy  stronger  than  any  possible  hostile 
combination.  They  changed  this  policy  in  sign- 
ing an  AHiance  with  Japan,  whereby  their  mari- 
time interests  in  the  Pacific  were  safeguarded  by 
agreement  and  they  could  withdraw  their  naval 
forces  from  that  sea.  The  effectiveness  of  this 
policy  of  agreement  was  proved  in  the  War,  when 
Japanese  and  not  British  warships  convoyed  the 
Anzac  transports. 

This  example  is  of  especial  interest,  as  the 
Washington  Conference  was  called  primarily  to 
consider  naval  armaments.  Great  Britain,  the 
principal  sea-power,  has  shown  the  way.  If 
agreements  can  be  reached  which  will  convince 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  VITAL  INTERESTS  7 

the  British,  the  Japanese  and  Americans  that  their 
maritime  interests  are  secure,  a  general  cut  in 
naval  programs  will  be  immediately  possible. 

Next  in  importance  to  questions  of  naval  riv- 
alry, the  Conference  will  be  occupied  with  com- 
mercial disputes.  In  this  area  of  conflict,  also, 
Britain  has  set  the  example  of  composing  disputes 
by  agreements.  Since  the  days  of  the  Norman 
Conquest,  England  and  France  had  been  heredi- 
tary enemies.  The  Napoleonic  Wars  had  intensi- 
fied the  ancient  hatred.  When,  after  Bismarck  had 
smashed  her  dream  of  dominating  the  Continent, 
France  turned  her  attention  to  colonial  enterprise, 
the  British  resented  what  seemed  like  poaching 
on  their  private  preserves.  Frictions  and  jeal- 
ousies developed  everywhere,  from  the  New- 
foundland Fisheries  to  the  heart  of  Africa  and 
the  borders  of  Siam.  The  Fashoda  Incident 
brought  things  to  the  verge  of  war.  But  wiser 
councils  at  last  prevailed  and  French  and  British 
diplomats  began  to  discuss  these  colonial  wrangles 
and  traders'  disputes.  Obviously  they  were  small 
affairs  compared  to  the  risk  of  war,  which,  what- 
ever its  outcome,  would  leave  them  both  weaker 
in  the  face  of  the  growing  menace  across  the 
Rhine.  Once  the  statesmen  realized  the  common- 
sense  gains  of  a  cordial  understanding,  it  was 
easy  to  draw  up  the  necessary  documents. 


8  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

What  man  has  done,  he  can  do  again,  and  we 
generally  find  it  possible  to  improve  on  past  per- 
formances. Diplomatic  history  contains  many 
cases — of  which  these  two  examples  are  illustra- 
tions— where  nations  have  secured  their  vital 
interests  by  agreement  and  have  by  so  much 
reduced  the  need  of  armaments.  If  there  is  suffi- 
cient will,  the  diplomats  at  Washington  will  find 
a  way.  That  is  the  real  problem — the  question 
of  Will.  Inertia,  habit,  all  the  old  hostilities  and 
distrusts  will  work  against  the  hoped-for  accom- 
plishments. Not  much  will  be  done  unless  a 
force  is  developed  to  override  obstacles.  In  the 
two  examples  given  above  there  was  an  obvious 
motive — the  increasing  menace  of  German  am- 
bitions. Will  there  be  so  strong  a  motive  at  work 
at  Washington?  There  is  today  no  hostile  nation 
growing  so  boisterously  in  power  and  preten- 
sions. 

It  is  rather  the  fashion  nowadays  to  cry  down 
idealistic  motives.  We  are  told  to  rely  on  the 
"hard  head"  rather  than  the  "warm  heart."  If 
we  cannot  reach  agreements  to  reduce  armaments 
for  better  reasons,  perhaps  the  fear  of  bankruptcy 
will  drive  us  to  it. 

The  only  force  on  which  we  can  rely  to  over- 
come suspicions  and  fears  is  Public  Opinion.  If 
the  people  really  want  a  reduction  of  armaments 
and  can  make  their  wishes  plain — whether  they 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  VITAL  INTERESTS  9 

are  inspired  by  a  moral  repugnance  to  war  or  a 
thrifty  dislike  of  taxation — they  can  dictate. 

But  the  first  step,  before  any  agreements  can 
be  drafted,  is  to  get  clear  statements  of  what  each 
nation  considers  its  ''vital  interests." 


CHAPTER  II 

America's  vital  interests — territorial 
defense  and  the  monroe  doctrine 

One  interest,  which  everybody  admits  is  vital  for 
all  nations,  is  the  defense  of  the  homeland  from 
hostile  invaders.  It  is  a  cause  for  which  men 
have  been  ready  to  fight  through  all  ages.  It  is, 
with  most  nations,  the  principal  reason  for  expen- 
ditures on  armaments. 

We,  of  the  United  States,  would  be  just  as 
quick  as  any  other  people  to  arm  to  the  teeth — 
if  we  feared  attack.  Fortunately  we  are  not 
threatened.  Probably  at  no  time  in  our  history 
have  we  had  less  reason  to  arm  on  this  account. 

There  is  much  dispute  as  to  the  meaning  of 
some  of  the  events  in  the  late  War,  but  there  is 
small  chance  of  contradiction,  if  we  accept  the 
following  points  as  definitely  established: 

First,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  while 
slow  to  anger,  will  fight  when  roused  with  great 
energy  and  remarkable  unity  of  spirit.  No  one 
is  likely  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  us  lightly, 

10 


AMERICA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  II 


Second,  the'vold  military  maxim,  that  difficulties 
increase  rapidly  with  every  lengthening  of  the 
hnes  of  communication,  has  been  greatly  strength- 
ened. As  a  general  rule,  the  campaigns  of  the 
War,  which  were  conducted  at  a  great  distance 
from  the  base,  were  fiascos.  The  decisive  fighting 
took  place  within  a  hundred  miles  of  the  main 
depots.  We  are  a  long  way  off  from  any  formi- 
dable rival. 

'^.Third,  no  campaign  succeeded  which  de- 
pended on  landing  troops  from  ships  on  hostile 
territory.  The  only  serious  attempt  was  at 
Gallipoli  and  that  example  will  not  encourage 
others.  Our  Expeditionary  Force  could  not  have 
been  effective  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  great 
depots  erected  in  France.  We  could  not  be  suc- 
cessfully attacked  by  an  overseas  enemy,  unless 
they  established  a  base  on  this  continent.  The 
railroads  in  Mexico  are  not  adequate  for  large 
scale  campaigns  and  the  climatic  conditions  are 
even  more  unfavorable.  Canada  offers  the  only 
possible  base  from  which  we  could  be  attacked, 
and  we  have  no  reason  for  fear  from  that  quarter. 
Fourth  and  most  important,  the  War  proved 
that,  unless  a  decision  is  won  quickly,  victory  is 
decided  by  endurance,  man-power  and  material 
resources.  The  first  defeat  of  the  Germans  at 
the  Marne  was  the  deciding  factor  of  the  War. 
Once  stopped  on  their  first  dash,  their  chance  was 


12  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

gone.  (The  only  other  chance  they  had  was  a 
break-up  of  the  alliance,  and  in  any  war  of  de- 
fense we  would  not  have  to  worry  about  the 
defection  of  allies.)  It  is  hard  to  imagine  any 
Expeditionary  Force  large  enough,  even  if  it 
could  use  Canada  as  a  base,  to  win  a  decisive 
victory  quickly.  However  unprepared  we  might 
be  at  the  moment  of  attack,  we  are  long  on  en- 
durance, man-power  and  material  resources. 
Without  Canada  as  a  base  no  serious  attack  is 
possible,  and  even  with  her  the  chances  of  success 
are  too  remote  to  make  it  attractive  to  the  most 
hungry  coalition.  The  scare  stories  furnished  us 
by  the  advocates  of  ''Preparedness"  in  the  days 
before  191 7  are  rendered  ridiculous  by  the  experi- 
ences of  the  War.  But  of  course,  when  they  were 
talking  to  us  about  "defense"  in  those  days,  they 
were  really  trying  to  prepare  us  to  take  part  in 
a  great  offensive  overseas. 

Today  we  are  not  threatened  by  any  one.  We 
cannot  claim  that  National  Defense  is  the  excuse 
for  our  armaments. 

*         *         * 

Almost  all  of  our  statesmen  and  publicists  have 
agreed  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine was  also  a  "vital  interest."  Unfortunately 
we  have  allowed  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  to 
grow  up  and  to  persist  about  what  we  mean  by 
this  Doctrine,  an  uncertainty  which  has  always 
worked  out  to  our  detriment.     It  has  made  Euro- 


AMERICA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  13 

pean  Powers  unnecessarily  jealous,  it  has  made 
the  Latin-American  Republics  suspicious  of  our 
intentions,  and  of  late  this  same  uncertainty  has 
allowed  the  more  enterprising  of  the  Japanese 
Imperialists  to  pretend  that  their  Twenty-one  De- 
mands on  China — now  happily  repudiated  by 
more  responsible  opinion  in  Japan — were  simply 
an  attempt  to  establish  a  Monroe  Doctrine  for 
Asia.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  Conference  at 
Washington  will  give  our  Government  the  occa- 
sion to  define,  beyond  any  chance  of  misunder- 
standing, just  what  we  mean  by  this  vital  interest. 
We  have  nothing  to  gain  and  much  to  lose  by 
vagueness. 

Historically  the  matter  is  clear  enough;  any 
one  who  will  read  the  records  can  find  out  what 
President  Monroe  had  in  mind.  Successful  revo- 
lutions had  driven  Spain  from  the  American  main- 
land. Her  colonies  had  established  independent 
Republics.  It  was  rumored  that  Spain  was 
appealing  to  the  Holy  Alliance  for  aid  in  the 
reconquest  of  her  former  possessions.  The 
President  in  a  Message  to  Congress  stated  that 
any  attempt  of  European  Governments  to  extend 
their  political  systems  on  this  hemisphere  would 
be  regarded  by  us  as  an  unfriendly  act.  He  did 
not  propose  to  drive  the  European  Powers  out  of 
their  remaining  colonies  on  this  side  of  the  world. 
He  said  that  we  would  resent  and  resist  efforts  on 
their  part  to  establish  new  colonies  or  to  create 


14  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

any  new  spheres  of  political  influence.  It  is  clear 
that  in  his  mind  this  question  was  closely  asso- 
ciated with  the  defense  of  our  own  territory. 
He  did  not  want  to  see  Latin-America  "Balkan- 
ized."  He  did  not  think  that  it  was  safe  for  us 
to  allow  states  to  grow  up  in  the  New  World 
which  owed  allegiance  to  Europe  and  whose 
foreign  policy  would  be  dictated  by  European 
Prime  Ministers, 

But  Monroe  did  not  declare  a  Protectorate  over 
the  Latin-American  Republics.  He  did  not  claim 
for  us  any  special  political  or  economic  privi- 
leges, or  any  spheres  of  influence.  He  made  no 
suggestion  that  we  would  claim  a  right  to  close 
the  door  of  economic  opportunity  on  our  commer- 
cial rivals. 

If  the  Japanese  today  should  make  a  declara- 
tion that  they  would  resent  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  a  foreign  Power  to  extend  its  poHtical 
control  on  the  continent  of  Asia  and  made  no 
claim  of  special  privileges  for  themselves,  they 
would  be  doing  very  much  what  Monroe  did,  and 
for  the  life  of  me  I  cannot  see  any  reason  why 
we  should  object.  But  until  the  Japanese  show 
more  respect  for  their  repeated  pledges  to  main- 
tain the  Open  Door  in  those  parts  of  China  where 
they  have  already  established  themselves  they  will 
not  be  suspected  of  much  sincerity  in  their  talk  of 
an  Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine. 


AMERICA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  1 5 

The  meaning,  which  we  put  into  the  Doctrine, 
has  grown  beyond  Monroe's  original  intention. 
When  President  Cleveland  prevented  the  British 
from  forcibly  collecting  a  debt  in  Venezuela,  he 
did  something  that  Monroe  never  dreamed  of. 
And  in  taking  this  step,  he  greatly  increased  our 
responsibilities.  If  we  are  not  going  to  allow 
the  European  Powers  to  protect  their  interests  in 
Latin-America  in  the  usual  way,  we  assume  a 
duty  to  see  that  their  interests  are  not  attacked. 

There  was  also  the  unfortunate  flurry  about 
Magdalena  Bay.  The  excitement,  which  was 
stirred  up  over  the  wild  story  that  the  Japanese 
were  planning  to  establish  a  Naval  Base  in  this 
unsuitable  Mexican  harbor,  has  given  some 
grounds  for  the  popular  belief,  very  prevalent  in 
Japan,  that  we  intend  to  use  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  thwart  the  peaceful  enterprise  of  foreign  com- 
merce in  Latin-America.  There  is  of  course 
nothing  in  the  recorded  thought  of  Monroe  to 
warrant  such  action  on  our  part  and  the  Govern- 
ment has  never  made  any  such  pretension. 

Also,  there  has  been  much  discussion  in  our 
papers  of  late  as  to  whether  the  reference  of  a 
dispute  between  South  American  Republics  to 
the  arbitrament  of  a  European  Tribunal  would 
be  an  infringement  of  the  famous  Doctrine.  Here 
again  we  can  say  with  certainty  that  President 
Monroe  never  had  such  a  problem  in  mind.    He 


1 6  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

was  thinking  about  the  preservation  of  peace  in 
the  New  World.  He  would  have  resented  it  if 
some  European  Power,  hoping  to  gain  a  political 
foothold,  had  tried  to  mix  into  a  South  American 
dispute  uninvited.  But  he  never  said  anything 
to  raise  a  doubt  as  to  the  full  independence  of 
these  southern  Republics  and  their  right  to  settle 
their  disputes  in  their  own  way.  It  is  only  in  the 
last  half  century  that  we  have  wounded  the  sus- 
ceptibilities of  these  Republics  by  allowing  it  to 
appear  that  we  wanted  to  boss  them.  Monroe 
never  put  forward  any  such  claim. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine — the  real  essence  of 
which  is  the  prevention  of  foreign  interference  in 
the  free  political  development  of  Latin-America, 
an  interference  which  would  inevitably  trouble  the 
peace  of  the  New  World — is  as  much  a  vital 
interest  to  us  now  as  ever.  But  like  the  supreme 
interest  of  territorial  defense,  it  is,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  armament,  a  dormant  issue.  Nobody 
threatens  it.     And  for  this  there  are  two  reasons. 

First  of  all,  the  South  American  Republics, 
especially  the  ABC  states,  have  developed  suffi- 
cient strength  to  defend  their  own  independence. 
We  do  not  need  to  build  battleships  to  keep  any- 
body from  trying  to  make  a  colony  of  Argentine. 
However  much  the  Latin-Americans  are  inclined 
to  sputter  at  the  overbearing  way  in  which  we 
sometimes  discourse   on   the   Monroe   Doctrine, 


AMERICA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  1 7 

they  would  each  start  a  Monroe  Doctrine  of  their 
own — under  another  name — if  any  foreign  Power 
attempted  to  subjugate  one  of  their  number. 

Secondly,  all  the  rest  of  the  world  has  come 
to  realize  that  the  results  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
have  been  on  the  whole  very  good.  It  has  been 
generally  beneficial  that  South  America  has  been 
preserved  from  the  colonial  scramble  which  has 
made  so  much  havoc  in  Africa  and  Asia.  At  the 
Peace  Conference  at  Paris,  our  representatives 
found  no  serious  opposition  from  any  of  the 
Great  Powers  to  the  general  acceptance  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Our  "vital  interests"  in  this 
matter  are  more  securely  guarded  by  such  agree- 
ments than  they  would  be  by  any  number  of 

battleships. 

*         *        * 

These  two  interests  are  none  the  less  vital  be- 
cause they  are  for  the  moment  dormant.  We  do 
not  vote  Army  and  Navy  appropriations  to  pro- 
tect our  territory  from  invasion  nor  to  maintain 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  because  neither  of  them  is 
threatened.  But  if  unfortunate  circumstances 
should  arise,  which  made  us  lose  confidence,  we 
would  arm  just  as  quickly  as  anybody  else.  We 
are  not  particularly  pacific;  we  are  safer.  But 
if  our  occasional  irritations  with  the  British  Em- 
pire should  turn  into  serious  hostility,  if  Canada 
showed  signs  of  ill-will  and  began  training  large 


1 8  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

armies,  or  if  we  should  have  plausible  reason  to 
believe  that  some  overseas  Power  was  planning 
a  raid  on  Latin-America — as  Napoleon  III.  did, 
when  we  were  utterly  distracted  by  our  Civil  War 
— we  would  not  be  discussing  the  limitation  of 
armaments.  The  price  of  plough-shares  would 
go  up,  so  many  people  would  be  bidding  for  them, 
to  beat  them  into  swords.  If  we  really  were 
worried  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
shoulder  as  heavy  a  military  burden  as  Switzer- 
land. They  train  all  their  young  men  and  can 
mobihze  a  tenth  of  their  population  in  forty-eight 
hours.  For  us  that  would  mean  a  prepared  army 
of  ten  million  men. 

But  we  are  not  seriously  worried  about  either 
of  these  vital  interests.  They  are  amply  pro- 
tected, partly  by  distance,  partly  by  such  century- 
old  treaties  as  that  of  Ghent  and  by  the  more 
recent  general  recognition  of  the  validity  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  was  won  at  Paris.  They 
have  been  removed  from  the  area  of  distrust  into 
the  civilized  zone  of  agreement. 

So  the  problem  before  our  delegates  at  the 
Washington  Conference  will  be  to  see  if  they  can 
bring  our  other  vital  interests  into  this  same  zohe, 
arrange  agreements  with  the  other  Powers,  which 
will  inspire  such  confidence  that  we  will  not  feel 
impelled  to  maintain  expensive  armaments  in 
their  defense. 


CHAPTER  III 

America's  vital  interests — the  freedom 
OF  the  seas 

Our  century-old  controversy  with  Great  Britain, 
about  how  the  seas  should  be  ruled,  is  a  funda- 
mental issue  in  any  discussion  of  Naval  Arma- 
ments, "i  If  it  does  not  figure  on  the  Agenda  at 
the  Washington  Conference,  it  will  be  because 
some  agreement — tacit  or  formal — has  been 
reached  before  the  Conference  opens.  Just  as 
the  Japanese  would  prefer  to  settle  the  wrangle 
over  the  Island  of  Yap  by  "direct  negotiations," 
rather  than  in  "full  conference,"  so  there  would 
be  advantages,  both  to  Britain  and  to  us,  if  this 
cause  of  irritation  could  be  removed  before  the 
questions,  in  which  we  hope  to  work  together, 
come  before  the  delegates.  Some  sort  of  a  modus 
Vivendi  may  already  have  been  reached,  which 
will  avoid  the  embarrassment  of  a  public  discus- 
sion of  this  family  dispute. 

But  to  ignore  the  issue  would  simply  be  hiding 
our  heads  in  the  sand.     Always  our  statesmen 

19 


20  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

have  considered  this  matter  a  "vital  interest,"  and 
from  time  to  time,  when  some  incident  has  brought 
it  to  the  front  page  of  our  newspapers,  pubHc 
opinion  has  rallied  to  their  support.  Like  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  it  is  a  subject  we  do  not  often 
think  about,  but  whenever  events  force  it  to  our 
attention,  we  think  about  it  intensely  and  with 
considerable  heat.  We  broke  off  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  France  when  Napoleon's  "continental 
blockade"  interfered  with  our  rights  at  sea.  We 
fought  the  War  of  1812  on  the  same  issue.  It 
was  in  defense  of  these  rights  tha^'^we  smashed 
the  Barbary  Pirates.  And  it  was  what  happened 
to  our  citizens  at  sea  in  1914^15-16  that  brought 
the  Great  War  home  to  us  and  finally  forced  us 
to  take  sides  against  Germany.  The  importance 
of  the  matter  has  varied  with  us  from  decade  to 
decade.  In  our  early  days,  when  our  clipper 
ships  traded  in  all  the  Seven  Seas,  the  greatest 
part  of  our  wealth  was  ocean  borne,  but  the 
winning  of  the  West  distracted  our  attention  from 
the  sea  for  several  generations.  Now  we  are  once 
more  building  up  a  merchant  marine.  We  cannot 
be  indifferent  to  the  law  which  rules  the  sea. 

We  had  best  give  up  the  phrase:  "The  Freedom 
of  the  Seas."  The  Germans  ruined  it  by  appro- 
priating it  during  the  War  and  using  it  in  a  sense 
definitely  hostile  to  the  British.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  our  diplomats  will  find  some  other  phrase, 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  21 

which  will  not  sound  as  if  it  had  been  made  in 
Germany  and  which  will  make  clear  to  our  friends 
in  England  just  what  we  are  driving  at.  If  they 
understand  what  we  mean,  it  will  no  longer  seem 
dreadful  to  them. 

What  is  the  issue  in  this  old  controversy? 
What  do  we  want?  Can  it  be  reconciled  with  the 
"vital  interests"  of  Britain?  It  is  of  primary 
importance  that  our  Government  should  make 
the  American  contention  entirely  plain — not  only 
plain,  but  also  acceptable. 

Much  bitter  opposition  to  the  League  of  Na- 
tions has  been  based  on  the  erroneous  idea  that 
it  would  be  a  Superstate,  demanding  a  surrender 
of  sovereignty  from  its  members.  There  is 
nothing  to  warrant  such  a  fear,  but  some  of  the 
Republican  Senators  have  been  especially  elo- 
quent about  this  imaginary  danger,  so  we  may  be 
sure  that  no  machinery  will  be  established  at 
Washington  which  will  have  the  power  to  compel 
a  sovereign  nation  to  sacrifice  what  it  considers 
its  "vital  interests"  on  behalf  of  cosmopolitan 
welfare.  This  Conference  can  accomplish  nothing 
except  on  the  basis  of  voluntary  agreement.  If 
we  are  not  convinced  that  our  interests  on  the 
seas  are  adequately  protected  by  agreement,  we 
must  either  give  up  going  to  sea  or  build  war- 
ships to  defend  our  rights.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  our  proposals  seem  to  the  British  to  endanger 


2  2  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

their  "vital  interests"  they  will  not  accept  them 
and  the  competition  in  Naval  Armaments  will 
continue. 

A  solution  of  this  problem  would  be  a  tre- 
mendous step  towards  general  disarmament,  a 
necessary  first  step.  If  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples, 
speaking  the  same  language,  are  so  distrustful  of 
each  other  that  they  must  arm  to  the  teeth,  there 
is  no  ground  for  querulous  surprise  that  the 
Greeks  and  the  Turks  are  in  the  market  for  more 
guns. 

Fortunately  there  is  every  reason  to  believe 
that  a  mutually  satisfactory  arrangement  can  be 
reached  with  Britain.  In  these  days  of  aircraft, 
the  Atlantic  is  hardly  wider  than  the  Great  Lakes 
were  in  1814,  when  we  signed  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent  and  disarmed  along  the  Canadian  frontier. 
We  signed  that  treaty  with  Britain,  immediately 
after  a  bitter  war,  in  which  we  had  sunk  a  good 
many  of  her  ships  and  in  which  she  had  burned 
our  capital.  Now  we  are  to  meet  again  to  discuss 
the  reduction  of  armaments,  but  this  time  right 
after  a  greater  war,  in  which  we  have  fought  as 
comrades.  What  was  possible  in  a  small  way, 
when  we  were  angry,  ought  now  to  be  feasible 
on  a  larger  scale.  Surely  there  is  nothing  so 
dreadful  in  salt  water,  that,  while  we  need  nothing 
but  police  boats  on  the  lakes,  we  must  have  war 
fleets  on  the  ocean. 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  2$ 

The  dispute  has  to  do  with  the  rights  of  neu- 
trals during  naval  warfare.  Since  Piracy  was 
abolished,  the  seas  have  been  free  in  time  of 
peace.  The  citizen  of  any  nation  could  go  about 
his  business  on  the  ocean,  unarmed  and  without 
fear  of  arbitrary  interference.  He  could  know 
just  what  his  rights  were.  But  the  outbreak  of 
war  at  sea  immediately  ends  all  that  sense  of 
ordered  security  which  is  the  essence  of  freedom. 
Sailor  folk,  when  they  fight,  do  it  in  a  "natural" 
and  unrestrained  way.  They  strike  so  hard  at 
their  enemies  that,  quite  as  often  as  not,  they 
destroy  people  who  have  not  the  remotest  interest 
in  their  quarrel.  It  is  this  injury  to  innocent 
neutrals  which  has  caused  protest. 

No  one  has  much  sympathy  for  the  non-com- 
batant, who  is  not  really  neutral,  who  is  helping 
actively  one  belligerent  against  the  other,  but,  due 
allowance  being  made  for  this  class  of  false  neu- 
trals, there  is  always  a  large  bulk  of  sea  commerce 
which  is  in  no  way  involved  in  the  issues  of  the 
war.  History  shows  only  too  plainly  that,  in 
the  absence  of  any  generally  accepted  Law  of  the 
Seas,  what  the  neutrals  claim  as  their  rights  is 
not  worth  writing  down  on  paper. 

The  great  loss  to  neutrals  in  a  naval  war  is 
not  so  much  due  to  the  confiscation  of  their  car- 
goes, nor  the  occasional  sinking  of  their  ships, 
as  it  is  to  uncertainty.  They  do  not  know,  from 
day  to  day,  what  they  can  safely  consider  their 


24  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

rights.  That  will  be  determined  for  them,  with- 
out consulting  them,  as  the  fighting  develops. 
The  belligerent  who  comes  out  on  top  will — on 
the  basis  of  Might  and  his  own  convenience — 
announce  to  the  nations  what  he  is  pleased  to 
consider  International  Law.  No  neutral  ship- 
owner can  accept  a  charter  with  any  certainty, 
because  a  cargo  which  is  on  the  free  list  today 
may  be  declared  contraband  after  he  puts  to  sea. 
No  neutral  business  man  can  rely  on  a  contract 
which  involves  an  overseas  transaction.  Mari- 
time insurance  and  freight  rates  soar  to  a  point 
of  practical  blockade,  upsetting  all  the  normal 
processes  of  commerce. 

It  is  this  uncertainty  against  which  we  have 
always  protested.  Once  war  is  declared  all  idea 
of  freedom  based  on  the  stability  of  law  disap- 
pears. The  billigerent  who  wins  control  of  the 
seas  twists  International  Law  to  suit  his  purpose 
and  the  neutral  must  bow  to  the  Rule  of  Force. 
During  the  Anglo-French  Wars  of  1793  to  1814, 
each  belligerent — just  as  our  interests  were 
trampled  on  by  both  sides  in  the  Great  War — 
issued  edict  after  edict,  destroying  one  after 
another  the  time-honored  and  accustomed  rights 
of  neutral  commerce.  To  be  sure  each  of  these 
edicts  was  justified  as  a  "reprisal"  against  the 
illegal  actions  of  the  other  belligerent.  But  the 
bizarre  idea,  that  innocent  neutrals  should  be 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  2$ 

punished  for  the  wrong-doings  of  an  enemy,  be- 
came so  vexatious  that  we  broke  off  diplomatic 
relations  with  France  and  declared  war  on  Eng- 
land. 

This  tendency  to  ignore  the  rights  of  others, 
when  yourself  engaged  in  war,  is  not  confined  to 
any  one  nation.  We  also  have  been  offenders. 
In  the  Civil  War  we  invented  innovations  in  the 
Rules  of  Blockade — the  Doctrine  of  Continuous 
Voyage — just  as  recklessly  denying  what  the 
neutrals  called  their  rights,  as  the  British  had 
done  with  their  ''Orders  in  Council,"  or  Napoleon 
with  his  "continental  blockade." 

In  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  for  the  first  time 
in  history,  Russia  put  foodstuff — rice — on  her 
contraband  list.  The  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  protested,  and,  as  we  had  overpower- 
ing navies,  the  Government  of  the  Tsar  thought 
better  of  it  and  removed  the  ban  from  food- 
stuff. 

There  is  no  generally  accepted  Law  of  Naval 
Warfare;  there  are  only  a  number  of  vague 
precedents,  of  which  the  clearest  is  that  the  nation 
which  controls  the  sea  can  do  just  about  what  it 
pleases.  As  there  is  no  code  which  all  nations 
have  voluntarily  agreed  to  respect,  each  nation 
when  it  becomes  a  belligerent  interprets — or  ig- 
nores— the  precedents  as  it  sees  fit.  The  result 
is  uncertainty  and  inevitable  loss,  that  falls  more 


26  TEE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

heavily  on  those  who  keep  the  peace  than  on 

those  who  break  it. 

*         *         * 

Although  the  British  Government  came  very 
near  to  agreeing  with  us  on  the  advisability  of 
having  a  general  agreement  on  the  Law  of  the 
Sea,  in  the  years  just  before  the  War,  in  the 
negotiations  regarding  the  Declaration  of  London, 
they  at  last  refused  to  ratify  it.  Perhaps  one 
reason  why  we  have  never  been  able  to  make 
the  British  quite  see  our  point  in  this  matter  is 
that  they  have  suffered  less  than  we  or  other 
nations,  when  trying  to  maintain  neutral  rights 
during  a  naval  conflict.  Always  they  have  had 
their  great  fleet,  holding  the  balance  of  power, 
and,  no  matter  how  desperately  angry  the  bel- 
ligerents might  be  at  each  other,  they  would  take 
care  to  fire  in  the  other  direction  when  a  British 
ship  sailed  by.  During  the  Civil  War,  we 
stretched  the  Law  of  the  Sea  to  the  detriment 
of  neutral  shipping,  not  as  far  as  we  could  but 
as  far  as  we  dared.  When  one  of  our  over- 
zealous  naval  officers  stopped  the  British  ship 
"Trent"  and  took  off  two  agents  of  the  Con- 
federacy, Lincoln  wisely  decided  that  discretion 
was  the  better  part  of  valor  and  handed  them 
back  to  the  British  with  due  apologies.  If  the 
British  Navy  had  joined  forces  with  the  South, 
as  they  threatened,  the  hopes  of  the  Union  would 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  27 

have  been  over.  But  there  is  small  reason  to 
believe  that  we  would  have  given  up  these  two 
gentlemen  if  the  nation  which  was  protesting  on 
their  behalf  had  not  had  a  navy. 

In  any  sea  war,  neutral  commerce  is  bound  to 
suffer,  but  the  nation  with  the  largest  fleet  suffers 
least,  and  British  merchantmen  have  on  the  whole 
— notably  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War — been 
treated  with  considerably  more  respect  than  those 
of  weaker  nations.  This  makes  it  the  more  strik- 
ing, that  of  all  the  international  jurists  who  have 
argued  on  behalf  of  the  rights  of  neutral  com- 
merce. Englishmen  have  been  the  most  eloquent. 
Some  of  the  best  quotations  in  support  of  the 
American  contention  are  to  be  found  in  the  official 
British  Blue  Books. 

Although  this  is  striking,  it  is  not  surprising. 
Great  Britain  has  not  only  a  great  navy,  but  also 
the  largest  mercantile  marine  afloat  and,  since 
the  fall  of  Napoleon,  she  has  for  more  than  a 
century  been  neutral  in  all  the  great  naval  wars. 
During  this  hundred  years  of  neutrality,  her  main 
interest  was  the  protection  of  peaceful  commerce 
on  the  seas.  In  the  long  run,  unless  new  wars 
are  to  be  frequent,  British  interests  will  inevitably 
turn  again  in  this  direction. 

However,  in  19 14,  the  habit  of  British  neu- 
trality was  broken,  the  policy  which  she  had 
developed  in  the  long  years  of  peace  was  forgotten 


28  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

and  she  turned  back  to  the  Napoleonic  Era  for 
precedents.  His  Majesty's  Privy  Council  began 
issuing  Orders  after  the  old  manner,  inventing 
new  forms  of  blockade  under  new  names,  adding 
new  items  to  the  contraband  list.  It  was  rather 
like  a  thrilling  serial  in  a  weekly  publication,  the 
instalments  came  rapidly  and  each  one  had  for 
its  climax  some  new  interference  with  neutral 
rights.  Protests  from  Washington  and  other  neu- 
tral capitals  were  just  as  frequent.  But  from  the 
point  of  view  of  one  who  likes  a  good  argument, 
the  correspondence  was  spoiled  by  Germany. 
With  amazing  stupidity,  she  never  allowed  the 
indignation  of  the  neutrals  against  these  British 
innovations  to  boil  over.  Just  as  we  were  getting 
very  heated  over  some  new  "Order  in  Council," 
Germany  distracted  our  attention  with  a  crime. 
Controversies  over  commercial  rights  sank  into 
insignificance  when  the  "Lusitania"  went  down. 
If  it  were  not  all  so  tragic  there  would  be  an 
element  of  slapstick  farce  in  the  record  of  our 
effort  to  maintain  an  unbiased  neutrality  during 
the  first  years  of  the  War.  First  Jack  stepped  on 
our  toes.  As  we  demanded  an  apology,  Johann 
kicked  us  in  the  ribs.  We  were  preparing  to 
challenge  him  to  a  duel,  when  Jack  slapped  us 
in  the  face.  And  so  it  went.  A  few  days  after 
the  "Sussex"  was  torpedoed,  when  feeling  was 
running  high  against  Germany,  a  Reply  to  one 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  29 

of  our  Notes  arrived  from  London,  which  no  one 
can  read  today  without  the  conviction  that  the 
British  Cabinet,  by  deliberate  tactlessness,  sought 
to  cool  our  growing  ardor  for  the  Cause  of  the 
Entente.  If  we  had  been  determined  to  defend 
our  rights  at  sea  rigorously,  we  would  have  had 
to  declare  war  on  both  sides. 
*         *         * 

As  all  this  controversy  is  caused  by  the  distress 
of  neutrals  in  times  of  war,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
simplest  way  out  of  the  difficulty  would  be  some 
scheme  to  insure  peace.  But  it  is  because  we 
have  refused  to  take  part  in  the  League  of 
Nations — the  only  scheme  as  yet  suggested  to 
prevent  war — that  it  has  been  necessary  to  sum- 
mon this  special  Conference  at  Washington. 
Until  there  is  some  organization  of  th.e  nations, 
which  has  gathered  sufficient  strength  to  give 
general  confidence  in  the  stability  of  peace,  all 
maritime  nations  will  consider  the  protection  of 
their  rights  at  sea  a  "vital  interest."  Unless  we 
can  safeguard  them  by  agreement  we  will  have 
to  depend  for  their  defense  on  armament. 

A  reading  of  the  arguments  made  by  American 
representatives  at  the  various  International  Con- 
ferences, where  the  Law  of  the  Sea  has  been  dis- 
cussed, naturally  shows  considerable  variation  in 
regard  to  detail,  but  a  clear  consistency  on  the 
fundamental.     We  have  always  maintained  that 


30  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

the  law  of  the  seas,  like  our  Anglo-Saxon  law  on 
land,  should  be  based  on  the  consent  of  those  to 
be  governed  by  it.  That  is  the  meaning  we  have 
put  in  the  phrase:  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas. 
Secure  Freedom,  based  on  an  established  Code  of 
Law,  to  which  all  maritime  nations  are  bound  by 
voluntary  agreement,  a  stable  statute,  which  will 
make  clear  to  all  their  rights  and  duties — such 
freedom  from  arbitrary  interference  as  we  are 
accustomed  to  under  the  Law  of  the  Land.  At 
present,  we  have  a  state  of  anarchy  at  sea  as  soon 
as  war  is  declared.  We  do  not  know  what  we 
are  free  to  do,  until  one  belligerent  has  won  con- 
trol of  the  seas  and  has  decreed,  on  the  basis  of 
Might,  what  the  "law"  shall  be  for  the  rest  of  us. 

Any  one,  trained  in  legal  lore,  will  find  the 
argument  stated  at  length  in  the  case  of  the  steam- 
ship "Zamora,"  in  which  a  British  Prize  Court  in 
19 1 6  sustained  our  contention  that  the  Privy 
Council,  which  is  a  purely  British  body,  could  not 
create  International  Law. 

A  better  illustrjition  for  the  layman  is  found  in 
the  controversy  over  "bunker  coal."  We  were 
not  a  party  to  this  dispute,  as  it  lay  between 
Britain  and  the  European  neutrals.  An  old 
maxim  of  International  Law,  accepted  without 
demur  by  the  British  Prize  Courts,  was  that  things 
"needful  for  the  working  of  the  ship  or  the  com- 
fort of  the  crew"  could  not  be  treated  as  contra- 


THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS  3 1 

band.  But  suddenly  a  British  Order  in  Council 
put  "coal,  of  enemy  origin,"  on  the  contraband 
list.  No  ship,  with  German  coal  in  its  bunkers, 
was  safe  from  seizure  outside  of  the  Baltic. 

From  our,  American,  point  of  view,  it  is  a  mere 
detail  whether  or  not  coal  should  be  classed  as 
contraband,  but  we  maintain  that  a  well-estah> 
lished  rule  of  International  Law  cannot  be  changed 
by  any  one  nation  to  suit  its  convenience  of  the 
moment.  When  all  the  text-books  on  Interna- 
tional Law  say  that  the  nations  have  agreed  that 
things  needful  for  the  working  of  the  ship  are  free 
from  suspicion  of  contraband,  a  sea  captain  has 
a  right  to  believe  it.  He  has  a  right  to  take  on 
bunker  coal  wherever  he  wants  to,  and  neither 
Britain  nor  Germany  nor  we  have  a  right  to  treat 
it  as  prize.  We  are  interested,  not  so  much  in 
the  contents  of  the  Sea  Code,  as  in  its  nature 
and  source.  If  everybody  else  thinks  that 
bunker  coal  should  be  on  the  contraband  list,  we 
have  no  objection.  Our  main  contention  is  that 
the  Sea  Code — whatever  is  written  into  it,  and 
whatever  amendments  may  from  time  to  time  be 
necessary — should  be  based  on  conference  and 
agreement.  The  Rules  of  Sea  Warfare  must  be 
determined  either  by  the  nation  with  the  strongest 
navy,  or,  if  it  is  to  deserve  the  name  of  Inter- 
national Law,  it  must  be  based  on  agreement 
among  the  nations.     In  the  first  case  we  will  have 


32  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

to  keep  our  navy  polished.  In  the  second  case, 
we  have  always  been  ready  to  pledge  our  honor 
to  observe  the  rules  to  which  we  have  agreed  with 
scrupulous  punctilio, 

Hs  ^  4= 

There  is  a  possibility  of  making  a  "detour" 
around  this  difficult  problem,  along  some  by-road 
of  temporary  and  makeshift  compromise.  There 
has  been  some  discussion,  for  instance,  of  equality 
between  the  two  navies.  This  would  in  theory 
give  us  just  as  good  a  chance  as  the  British  to 
tie  knots  in  International  Law.  But  the  ingenuity 
of  Naval  Constructors  would  always  be  tempted 
to  upset  the  balance.  There  will  be  no  way  of 
getting  around  the  difficulty,  which  will  prove  as 
permanently  satisfactory  as  facing  it  frankly  and 
removing  it. 

If  the  Conference  at  Washington  reaches  per- 
manent and  satisfying  results,  it  will  be  by  work- 
ing out  methods  of  friendly  cooperation,  which 
will  gradually  allay  distrusts  and  build  up  cordial 
understandings,  giving  to  each  nation  such  con- 
fidence in  the  other's  spirit  of  fair  play,  such  as- 
surance that  each  will  respect  the  other's  "vital 
interests"  on  the  seas,  that  it  becomes  obviously 
foolish  to  go  on  wasting  money  on  Naval  Com- 
petition. If  suspicion  can  be  conquered,  there 
will  be  a  race  in  disarmament. 

If  we  and  the  British  can  trust  each  other  on 
Lake  Erie,  why  not  on  the  Atlantic? 


CHAPTER  IV 

America's  vital  interests — the  open  door 

f- 
When  John  Hay  wrote  his  first  Notes  about  The 

Open  Door  Policy  in  the  Far  East,  he  did  not 
claim  that  this  matter  was  for  us  at  that  time  a 
"vital  mterest,"  but  he  believed  that  inevitably 
it  would  become  one.~  Every  year's  statistics 
brings  new  evidence  of  the  growing  importance  of 
Oriental  trade.  The  present  Administration  is 
insistent  in  protecting  our  commercial  opportuni- 
ties in  all  the  former  enemy  territories,  now  held 
under  Mandate.  It  has  made  the  security  of 
American  investments  the  basis  of  its  discussions 
with  Mexico.  It  has  protested  to  the  Netherlands 
against  discrimination  in  regard  to  oil  in  the 
Dutch  East  Indies.  It  is  not  likely  to  weaken  in 
regard  to  the  Open  Door  in  China. 

John  Hay  had  other  values  in  mind  beside  the 
trade  balance.  He  saw  that  the  only  hope  for 
China  was  to  stop  the  scramble  for  spheres  of 
influence  and  concession,  which  was  tearing  the 
Celestial  Empire  to  pieces.     The  gains  from  this 

33 


34  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

scramble  were  loot,  rather  than  profits.  They 
went,  not  to  the  most  industrious,  but  to  the  least 
scrupulous.  They  were  secured  by  bribes  and 
bullying,  not  by  service.  Looting  brings  high 
dividends  while  it  lasts,  but  it  is  only  another 
name  for  killing  the  goose  that  lays  the  golden 
eggs.  What  was  going  on  in  China  was  a  dis- 
grace to  Western  Civilization.  And  Hay's  at- 
tempt to  establish  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door 
was  inspired  by  the  hope  of  stopping  a  crime, 
not  by  a  desire  to  share  in  the  spoils. 

Besides  our  interest  in  foreign  trade,  there  is 
great  sympathy  for  China  in  this  country,  a  strong 
desire  to  protect  her  from  spoliation,  so  there  is 
little  doubt  that  this  Administration  would  be 
supported  by  a  united  public  opinion  in  insisting 
that  the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  is  one 
of  our  vital  interests.  It  is  striking  that  many 
of  those  leaders  of  opinion — public  speakers  and 
newspaper  editors — who  have  been  most  vocifer- 
ous in  warning  us  against  any  Trans-Atlantic 
commitments,  think  it  quite  natural  that  we  should 
take  "a  strong  stand"  in  protecting  China  and  the 
Open  Door  in  the  Far  East.  The  farther  West 
you  go  beyond  the  Mississippi,  the  more  often 
you  encounter  people,  opposed  to  our  taking  any 
risks  on  behalf  of  peace  in  Europe,  who  are  quite 
ready  to  rush — Quixotically — to  arms  on  behalf 
of  China — and  trade  opportunities. 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  35 

It  certainly  would  be  fine,  if  we  could  secure 
China  against  further  encroachments  and  per- 
suade everybody  to  live  up  to  the  pledges  they 
have  given  about  preserving  equality  of  trade 
opportunities.     But  the  hard  thing  is  to  do  it. 

Some  wise  man  has  said  that  the  difference 
between  an  expert  and  a  layman,  is  that  the 
expert  understands  the  difficulties.  Almost  every- 
body in  New  York  City  has  wished  for  a  bridge 
across  the  Hudson.  But  the  experts  talked  about 
the  difficulties,  cost,  etc.  Now  we  are  told  that 
at  last  the  bridge  is  to  be  built.  The  experts 
have  overcome  the  difficulties — the  most  impor- 
tant of  which  we,  laymen,  never  realized. 

So  it  is  with  these  thorny  problems  across  the 
Pacific.  Those  of  us  who  have  spent  a  few  weeks 
in  the  Orient  as  tourists  have  seen  one  of  the 
difficulties — the  terrifying  pressure  of  the  birth 
rate  on  the  food  supply.  The  more  one  studies 
the  problem,  the  more  difficulties  are  discovered. 

Like  the  Anglo-Irish  situation,  like  our  own 
troubled  relations  with  Mexico,  like  so  discour- 
agingly  many  international  problems,  it  is  easier 
to  assess  past  blame  than  to  find  a  present  solution. 
We  have  to  begin  work  in  the  middle  of  a  mess. 
Any  lad  can  keep  a  new  stable  decent,  but  it  took 
Hercules  to  clean  up  those  of  Augeas. 

The  experts  have  not  yet  found  a  way  to  over- 
come the  difficulties  in  the  Far  East.     That  will 


36  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

be  the  principal  task  of  the  Conference  at  Wash- 
ington. 

^  ^  '^ 

A  letter  came  to  hand  the  other  day,  from  a 
man  who  formerly  had  unusual  opportunity  for 
studying  the  Diplomacy  of  the  Far  East.  It  was 
very  illuminating  on  some  of  these  difficulties. 

"I  haven't  any  information  on  what  the  Jap- 
anese are  planning  to  do  at  this  Conference,"  he 
wrote,  "but  I  am  willing  to  risk  a  prophecy  on 
the  line  they  v/ill  take.  All  they  need,  if  they 
want  to  raise  a  cloud  of  embarrassment,  is  a  little 
logic. 

"Their  enemies  sometimes  accuse  them  of  being 
merely  imitators  and  certainly  in  their  diplomacy 
they  are  great  on  precedent.  When  they  get  in 
bad,  it  is  because  they  have  followed  a  bad  prece- 
dent. And  we  have  furnished  them  plenty  of 
bad  ones.  They  will  have  learned  from  the  his- 
tory of  former  Conferences  that  the  nation  which 
allows  itself  to  be  put  on  the  defensive  in  such 
discussions  always  comes  off  badly.  They  will 
search  for  a  precedent  on  how  to  take  the  offensive. 

"They  will  find  just  what  they  want  in  the 
Conference  of  Algeciras.  You  remember  that 
Germany  insisted  on  that  Conference  to  protect 
the  Sultan  of  Morocco  from  the  aggressive  designs 
of  France.  Well,  the  French  Delegation,  at  the 
very  first  session,  took  the  wind  out  of  the  German 


THM  OPEN  DOOR  37 

sails  by  suggesting  that  all  accept,  as  a  basis  for 
the  discussion,  a  pledge  to  maintain  the  political 
sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  the  territorial  integrity 
of  his  realm  and  the  principle  of  equal  trade 
opportunities.  There  was  nothing  left  to  discuss 
but  details.  After  the  Conference  disbanded, 
France  proceeded  to  depose  the  Sultan,  divide  up 
his  realm  and  close  the  door  on  competitive  com- 
merce— our  own  American  commerce  included. 
Not  a  pretty  precedent,  you  will  say?  No.  But 
it  was  effective  and  just  the  kind  of  precedent  the 
Japanese  follow  with  such  touching  fidelity. 

"The  Japanese  will  arrive  at  Washington  with 
their  well-known  and  somewhat  exaggerated  smile, 
and  my  bet  is  that,  at  the  first  opportunity,  they 
will  ask  permission  to  read  a  proposal  for  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  Far  Eastern  problems. 
In  a  very  high  moral  tone,  they  will  contend  that 
the  security  of  China,  freed  from  the  exploitation 
of  foreign  concessionaires,  its  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  guaranteed  by  international 
pledges,  is  the  dearest  wish  of  Japan.  Of  next 
importance,  in  their  opinion,  will  be  the  rigorous 
application  of  the  policy  of  John  Hay  in  regard 
to  the  Open  Door.  Japan  would  be  ready  to 
welcome  any  cooperation  in  such  measures  to 
insure  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  East.  She 
would  be  glad  to  abandon  all  her  pretensions  to 
special  interests  within  the  historic  frontiers  of 


38  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

China,  as  soon  as  the  other  Powers  were  ready 
to  do  likewise.  Indeed,  the  value  of  Japan's  con- 
cessions are  very  modest  compared  to  the  colony 
which  France  has  cut  out  for  herself  in  Indo- 
China.  She  could  well  afford  to  cancel  her 
spheres  of  influence  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia, 
if  the  British  would  do  the  same  in  Hong  Kong 
and  Thibet. 

"As  a  further  pledge  of  their  sincerity,  they 
may  propose  to  tear  down  the  tariff  barriers  in 
Formosa  and  Korea,  if  we  will  do  the  same  in  the 
Philippines  and  Alaska.  The}^  could  present  quite 
an  argument  about  the  injustice  of  our  excluding 
their  trade  from  the  Aleutian  Islands,  which  are 
so  much  nearer  to  their  territory  than  to  Seattle. 

"Of  course,"  he  wrote,  "I  do  not  believe  that 
the  Japanese  Delegation  will  be  quite  as  ironical 
as  this,  but  I  do  think  that  this  will  be  their 
general  line  of  attack.  Why  shouldn't  they? 
They  are  coming  here  reluctantly.  They  do  not 
know  how  far  they  can  trust  the  British.  They 
are  mightily  worried  about  an  Anglo-Saxon  trap. 
And  logic  is  their  trump  card. 

"Anybody  who  thinks  that  a  naughty  Japan  is 
to  be  brought  before  the  bar  of  a  virtuous  Chris- 
tendom is  counting  without  his — guest.  What 
do  we  accuse  Japan  of?  Annexing  Korea?  We 
annexed  the  Philippines.  France  carved  a  colony 
out  of  China.     The  missionaries  accuse  Japan  of 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  39 

drugging  the  Chinese,  smuggling  in  cocaine.  Is 
cocaine  so  much  worse  than  opium?  Japan  has 
violated  her  pledges  about  the  Open  Door  in 
Manchuria?  Guilty.  But  has  France  kept  her 
pledges  in  Morocco?  No,  The  only  charge  you 
can  substantiate  against  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  is  the  consistency  with  which  it  always 
follows  the  worst  Christian  precedent. 

"It  makes  the  Japanese  mad  to  be  called  the 
Prussians  of  the  Orient,  but  there  is  much  truth 
in  it.  A  good  many  of  them  are  spiritually  walk- 
ing down  Wilhelmstrasse — the  road  to  destruction. 
I  think  that  the  Japanese  are  in  bad,  have  taken 
the  wrong  trail  and  all  that,  but  it  would  be 
naive  folly  to  pretend  that  they  are  the  only 
offenders. 

"If  there  isn't  a  general  change  in  direction  out 
there  in  the  East,  there  will  be  a  terrible  smash. 
Although  I'm  sure  that  the  Conference  will  be 
a  bitter  farce,  if  it  is  run  on  any  holier-than-thou 
basis,  I  have  great  hopes.  Remember  that  the 
Japanese  are  having  a  hard  time,  too;  they  are 
just  as  much  perplexed  about  the  future  as  we. 
If  we  really  try  to  help  them  to  firmer  ground, 
we  have  a  wonderful  opportunity  to  regain  their 
friendship." 

This  letter  is  typical,  in  its  contrast  between 
the  cynical  despair  of  traditional  diplomacy  and 
the  growing  hope  for  finer  International  Relations, 


40  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

of  all  serious  modern  discussion  of  such  matters. 
If  the  Japanese  open  an  attack  along  the  lines 
he  suggests,  it  will  be  hard  to  answer  them.  But 
it  would  be  ill-advised  for  them  to  do  so.  It 
would  show  that  they  have  no  share  in  the  hope 
for  real  settlements  based  on  mutual  satisfaction 
and  good  will;  that  their  object  was  to  raise  a 
smoke  screen  behind  which  they  might  retreat 
without  loss  of  face.  But  all  the  world  would 
see  through  so  retrogressive  a  manoeuvre  and  no 
nation  today  can  find  a  source  of  pride  in  having 
blocked  the  progress  towards  peace,  so  ardently 
desired  by  all  the  world.  The  nation  which  is 
most  modest  in  its  claims,  most  sympathetic  to  the 
interests  of  others — raises  the  fewest  objections 
and  most  frequently  makes  conciliatory  sugges- 
tions— will  win  the  palms  at  this  Conference. 
*         *         * 

The  most  delicate  task  before  the  American 
Delegation  will  be  the  defining  of  what  are  our 
"vital  interests"  in  the  Far  East.  Even  if  it  is 
not  written  down  and  given  out  to  the  newspapers, 
the  definition  will  have  to  be  thought  out.  Cer- 
tainly we  would  like  to  see  all  the  foreign  Powers 
give  up  their  oppressive  and  disruptive  claims  to 
"spheres  of  influence"  in  China.  Is  it  a  vital 
interest  for  the  defense  of  which  we  must  arm? 
Are  we  prepared  to  be  just  as  insistent  in  talking 
to  Great  Britain  and  France  as  to  Japan?     Cer- 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  41 

tainly  we  would  like  to  see  the  Open  Door  a 
reality.  Are  we  ready  to  apply  the  principle  to 
our  own  dependencies,  or  is  it  a  rule  which  we 
like  when  it  favors  us  and  which  we  refuse  to 
discuss  when  it  works  against  us? 

Necessarily  the  refrain  of  all  these  articles  is 
that  the  Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Arma- 
ments will  get  us  nowhere,  unless  it  results  in 
voluntary  agreements.  It  is  not  enough  to  formu- 
late a  policy  of  the  Open  Door  in  China  which 
seems  just  to  us.  We  are  not  law-givers  to  the 
world.  Japan  cannot  be  expected  to  agree  whole- 
heartedly to  our  proposals,  unless  she  is  convinced 
that  they  protect  her  vital  interests  quite  as  much 
as  ours. 

Our  controversy  with  Britain  over  the  Freedom 
of  the  Seas  seems  much  more  easy  of  settlement 
than  the  reconciling  of  the  interests  of  Japan  and 
the  United  States  in  the  Far  East.  In  spite  of 
Messrs.  Hearst  and  Bottomley,  almost  everybody 
in  England  and  America  wants  a  settlement. 
There  has  been  more  heated  and  more  voluminous 
efforts  to  make  trouble  on  both  sides  of  the 
Pacific. 

But  those  who  talk  glibly  of  inevitable  conflict, 
who  quote  Mr.  Kipling  about  the  East  being  East 
and  the  West,  West,  should  read  the  verse  from 
which  they  quote  clear  through.  The  East  and 
the  West  are  going  to  meet  at  Washington.     And 


42  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

all  those  from  all  the  ends  of  the  earth,  who  pray 
for  Peace,  will  pray  that  they  meet  as  brave  men 
should,  fearlessly,  earnestly  and  with  clear  speech. 
We  will  not  help  along  the  cause  of  Peace  if 
we  fall  into  the  sins  of  vainglory  and  self- 
righteousness.  Japan  will  not  help  along,  if  she 
comes  in  with  some  cunning  insincerity — however 
well  precedented — to  confuse  the  issues.  But  if 
both  nations  are  brave  enough  to  be  frank,  confi- 
dent enough  to  be  conciliatory — not  afraid  of 
seeming  weak — there  is  room  to  hope  that  the 
Pacific  Ocean  may  continue  to  deserve  its  attrac- 
tive name. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  VITAL  INTERESTS   OF   GREAT  BRITAIN 

It  is  always  a  delicate,  thankless  task  to  define 
the  interests  of  other  people,  but  fortunately  the 
British  can  speak  for  themselves  in  -our  common 
language.  They  have  written  an  immense  amount 
on  the  subject  of  their  vital  interests.  Also  most 
of  us  have  the  opportunity  to  talk  it  over  with 
English  friends. . ;  Almost  all  that  has  been  said 
on  this  subject  can  be  reduced  to  one  word — Sea. 

The  irrefutable  logic  of  geological  formation 
makes  this  inevitably  the  major  interest  of  the 
British.  It  is  the  heaving  of  volcanic  forces,  the 
crumpling  of  the  earth's  crust,  rather  than  any 
choice  on  their  part,  which  has  determined  this 
matter.     They  are  an  Island  folk. 

Civilization  came  to  Britain,  with  Caesar,  from 
overseas.  Her  prosperity  has  always  come  from 
overseas  trade.     Her  Empire  is  overseas. 

England  was  the  first  country  to  get  caught 
in  the  industrial  revolution.  The  application  of 
steam  to  manufacture,  the  development  of  the 
factory  system,  immensely  intensified  production. 

43 


44  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

The  effect  was  the  same  in  England  as  that  we  are 
now  watching  in  Japan — an  increase  in  popula- 
tion, rapidly  outrunning  the  native  food  supply. 
Production  in  England,  under  this  new  system, 
also  quickly  surpassed  the  consumptive  power 
of  the  home  markets.  So  two  necessities  de- 
veloped simultaneoush^,  each  one  partly  the  cause 
and  partly  the  effect  of  the  other.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  find  foreign  markets  to  which  the  surplus 
production  of  the  factories  could  be  exported. 
It  was  equally  necessary  to  find  foreign  markets 
where  food  could  be  bought  for  import,  and  not 
food  only.  It  was  just  as  important  to  feed  the 
maw  of  the  machine  as  to  find  food  for  the  people. 
Raw  material — cotton,  metals,  rubber — had  to  be 
bought  abroad  and  the  only  way  to  pay  for  them 
was  by  exporting  manufactured  goods.  And  all 
of  these  foreign  markets  lay  across  the  seas. 

It  was  fortunate  for  Britain  that  she  was  the 
first  of  the  nations  to  be  caught  by  the  Industrial 
Revolution.  There  was  still  much  room  in  the 
world.  She  already  had  a  large  overseas  domain, 
built  up  on  the  colonial  system  of  the  i8th  Cen- 
tury. It  was  relatively  easy  for  her  to  consolidate 
her  position  in  the  most  favorable  foreign  markets. 

Her  Empire  also  proved  of  value  in  another 
way,  perhaps  equally  important.  It  furnished  a 
reservoir  into  which  she  could  pour  her  surplus 
population.      The    colonies    and    especially    the 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN      45 

Dominions  acted  as  a  safety  valve,  automatically 
establishing  a  minimum  wage.  If  life  became 
too  hard  in  the  industrial  centers,  there  was  always 
a  chance  to  emigrate  to  some  British  land  of  more 
promising  opportunities.  Just  as  the  Winning  of 
the  West  has  left  deep  imprints  on  our  national 
life,  so  the  development  of  the  Dominions  has 
played  a  role  of  great  importance  in  the  British 
Empire. 

For  the  nations,  which  became  industrialized 
later,  it  was  much  more  difficult  to  find  a  place 
in  the  sun.  The  forces  urging  to  expansion  were 
just  as  powerful,  but  all  the  best  fields  for  expan- 
sion were  already  occupied.  This  presented  a 
problem  to  Germany  that  was  too  much  for  her 
to  solve.  In  impatience  she  tried  to  cut  the 
Gordian  Knot — what  she  called  "encirclement" — 
by  the  sword.  Japan  is  now  faced  by  the  same 
problem.  And  this  Conference  on  the  Limitation 
of  Armaments  will  be  meaningless,  unless  it  suc- 
ceeds in  finding  some  peaceful  way  for  Japan  to 
solve  it. 

Pastoral  philosophers  may  argue  that  it  would 
have  been  better  for  the  British  if  they  had  never 
become  industrialized.  They  might  have  been 
happier  if  they  had  been  content  with  the  role  of 
an  insignificant  group  of  islands,  where  the  people 
plowed  and  sowed,  shepherded  flocks,  clad  them- 
selves in  the  products  of  Arts-Craft  looms,  and 


46  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

for  recreation  wrote  immortal  verse.  But  the 
English  never  had  the  chance  to  make  a  choice 
between  such  a  William  Morris  Arcadia  and  the 
grim  unloveliness  of  the  Five  Towns.  They  were 
in  the  grip  of  what  the  Germans  call  the  "Zeit- 
geist." Now  they  cannot  turn  back.  And  in 
this  kind  of  a  civilization,  which  the  Spirit  of  our 
Times  has  created,  British  interests  at  sea  are  not 
a  matter  of  more  or  less  profits,  but  of  Life  or 
Death. 

It  makes  no  difference  what  sort  of  a  Britisher 
you  talk  to,  you  will  find  the  conviction  bred  in 
his  bones  that  the  fate  of  the  nation  lies  on  the 
sea,  that  Britons  will  very  soon  be  slaves  if  any 
other  Power  rules  the  waves.  So  long  as  they 
have  any  energy  left,  of  brain  or  muscle  or  purse, 
they  will  use  it  to  protect  themselves  from  this 
menace.  They  will  buy  security  at  whatever  it 
costs — but  of  course  they  want  to  get  it  as  cheaply 
as  possible. 

Up  till  the  turn  of  the  century,  Britain,  in  her 
Splendid  Isolation,  relied  solely  on  her  own  navy 
for  the  protection  of  her  interests  on  the  seas. 
She  built  fleets  powerful  enough  to  give  her 
mastery  against  any  possible  combination  of 
hostile  nations.  This  arrangement  had  certain 
obvious  advantages,  but  its  cost  became  more  and 
more  oppressive.  Among  other  things  which  the 
progress  of  science  has  done  for  our  generation 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN      47 

has  been  to  multiply  and  multiply  the  expensive- 
ness  of  arms.  The  entire  Spanish  Armada,  prob- 
ably all  the  ships  Nelson  ever  commanded,  did 
not  cost  so  much  as  one  modern  Super-Dread- 
naught. 

As  the  tax  burden  incident  to  Ruling  the  Waves 
increased  beyond  reason,  British  statesmen  began 
to  look  around  for  partners  with  whom  to  share 
the  responsibility.  The  Japanese  Alliance  was 
the  first  step  in  this  new  pohcy.  It  protected,  and 
amply  protected,  British  interests  in  the  Pacific. 
The  next  step  was  the  Naval  Agreement  with 
France,  whereby  they  took  over  the  protection  of 
British  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  and  allowed 
the  concentration  of  the  Grand  Fleet  in  the  North 
Seas. 

During  this  period — 1900-1914 — the  British 
Government,  more  than  once,  sounded  us  out,  to 
see  if  we  would  come  in  on  the  combination.  It 
seems  that  we  generally  pretended  not  to  under- 
stand what  they  meant. 

The  War  tested  this  new  policy  and  proved 
that  it  was  good,  for  the  French  and  Japanese 
Navies  cooperated  with  the  British  in  accordance 
with  the  agreement.  But  the  War  also  proved 
once  more — and  so  vividly  that  no  Englishman 
who  lived  through  the  critical  winter  of  1917-18 
will  ever  forget — how  utterly  Britain  could  be 
defeated  if  an  enemy  could  close  against  her  the 


48  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

sea  routes  on  which  her  life  depends.  German 
submarines  came  within  measurable  distance  of 
doing  it.  Every  Britisher  knows  that  his  Empire 
cannot  survive  a  war  in  which  it  is  overpowered 
at  sea. 

*         *         * 

Our  proposal  for  a  generally  accepted  Sea 
Code,  which  would  assure  the  Freedom  of  the  Sea, 
has  never  been  agreed  to  by  the  British.  It  has 
not  seemed  to  them  to  guarantee  them  sufficient 
protection.  Here  as  elsewhere,  the  great  obstacle 
is  distrust.  We  have  refused  to  give  any  formal 
assurances  that  our  fleet  would  not  be  used  against 
them.  We  have  ignored  several  overtures.  It 
was  our  Senate,  not  Parliament,  which  refused  to 
ratify  the  General  Arbitration  Treaty. 

Then  there  is  the  more  generalized  distrust  that 
comes  from  the  realization  that,  when  people  are 
fighting  for  their  lives,  it  is  hard  for  them  to 
remember  the  promises  they  have  given  in  cool 
blood.  Of  course,  if  there  were  some  "organized 
major  force,"  ready  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on 
any  nation  which  violated  its  International  Agree- 
ments, it  would  be  easier — but  this  Conference  at 
Washington  has  been  rendered  necessary  because 
we  were  not  willing  to  go  into  such  an  arrange- 
ment. 

So  the  British  have  some  justification  in  being 
shy  of  our  proposed  Freedom  of  the  Seas.     It 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN      49 

demands  a  curtailment  of  their  privileges  and  no 
very  definite  assurances  from  us.  They  are  ac- 
customed to  ruling  the  waves,  and  have  found  it 
pleasant.  When  other  people  fell  out,  they  could 
cruise  around  the  outskirts  of  the  fray  and  pre- 
vent any  innovations  in  International  Law  which 
threatened  their  commercial  interests;  and  on  the 
rare  occasions  when  they  were  drawn  into  the 
conflict,  the  strength  of  their  navy  made  the 
weaker  neutrals  humble  and  respectful  in  talking 
about  their  "rights"  when  the  Privy  Council  in- 
vented some  new  interpretation  of  old  precedents. 
Any  one  is  naturally  reluctant  to  abandon  so 
privileged  a  position.  But  the  British,  finding  it 
a  terribly  costly  luxury,  have  discovered  how  to 
reduce  the  expense  by  means  of  Agreements,  first 
with  Japan  in  the  Pacific  and  then  with  France 
in  regard  to  the  Mediterranean.  They  are  now 
seeking  an  agreement  with  us. 

For  a  while  the  British  hoped  that  the  League 
of  Nations  would  solve  the  whole  difficulty.  If  a 
more  civilized  method  of  protecting  national  in- 
terests at  sea  should  win  general  confidence,  no- 
body would  waste  money  on  battleships.  But 
what  hope  there  was  in  the  League,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  ending  naval  competition,  was 
ruined  by  our  refusal  to  participate.  The  one 
nation  which  seriously  threatened  British  safety 
at  sea  stayed  out  of  the  general  agreement  to 


50  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

prevent  war  and  accepted  a  naval  program  which, 
if  it  were  not  answered  by  intensified  building  in 
England,  would  soon  leave  them  a  poor  second. 

We  are  all  trying  to  get  into  the  frame  of  mind 
in  which  we  will  feel  safe  in  reducing  our  arma- 
ments, so  it  would  be  worse  than  useless  to  recount 
the  old  irritations,  the  tactless  threats,  which 
goaded  the  last  Administration  into  laying  the 
foundation  of  our  present  building  program.  We 
want  to  forget  all  that  if  we  can.  The  disturbing 
fact  is  that  the  British,  feeling  very  intensely  that 
their  safety  depends  on  at  least  equahty  with  any 
other  Naval  Power,  which  might  become  hostile, 
find  our  attempt  to  outbuild  them  inexplicable, 
mysterious  and  therefore  threatening.  These 
Dreadnaughts  that  we  are  building  are  not  toy 
ships;  they  are  dangerous — to  somebody — to 
whom? 

From  the  point  of  view  of  all  the  nations  which 
have  entered  into  a  Covenant  to  prevent  Wars, 
this  navy  of  ours  is  outlaw.  Not  only  the  Eng- 
Hsh  but  all  the  world  is  asking,  ^'Against  whom 
are  the  Americans  building?" 

If  we  mahciously  wanted  to  make  the  British 
and  Japanese  nervous  and  suspicious,  we  could  not 
find  a  better  way  to  do  it.  If  .We^te  n6t  spending 
all  this  money  for  fun — just'fb  hear  it  rattle  as 
it  runs  away — it  must  be  against  one  or  both  of 
them.     Under  the  spell  of  the  old  traditions  of 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN       5 1 

diplomacy,  there  would  be  nothing  for  Britain  to 
do  in  the  circumstance  but  to  increase  her  own 
expenditures  to  the  limit  and  strengthen  her 
AUiances  against  us. 

Fortunately,  Lloyd  George  has  been  unwilling 
to  accept  the  idea  that  a  quarrel  is  inevitable. 
He  has  decided  on  at  least  one  more  try  at  an 
agreement.  As  a  result  of  the  Conference  of 
Dominion  Premiers,  he  has  publicly  proposed  an 
Anglo-American-Japanese  Triple  Alliance.  It  is 
uncertain  whether  such  an  agreement  is  advisable, 
it  is  uncertain  whether  our  public  opinion  would 
accept  it.  But  the  offer  has  been  made  this  time 
so  earnestly,  so  publicly,  that  we  cannot  pretend 
not  to  understand  what  it  means. 

If  our  refusal  to  join  the  League  is  final  and  if 
we  decide  to  reject  this  offer,  we  must  present 
some  counter-proposal  which  will  be  acceptable 
to  the  British  and  Japanese  or  there  is  no  use 
wasting  time  discussing  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ments— nobody  will  believe  that  we  want  it.  If 
we  cannot  agree  to  anything,  if  we  are  going  to 
reject  every  proposal  whether  it  is  originated  by 
ourselves  or  by  others,  we  had  best  settle  down 
at  once  without  further  palaver  to  outbuild  the 
Anglo-Japanese  combination. 

That  is  the  serious  phase  of  this  Conference. 
If  it  does  not  succeed,  the  failure  will  be  appalling. 
Once  you  begin  to  discuss  mutual  jealousies  and 


52  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

distrusts,  you  must  allay  them  or  they  will  become 
more  acute  than  ever. 

Two  proposals  for  the  Limitation  of  Naval 
Armaments  have  already  been  accepted  in  prin- 
ciple by  the  British — the  League  of  Nations  and 
a  Triple  Alliance  of  Britain,  the  United  States 
and  Japan.  If  we  really  want  to  decrease  this 
hideous  burden  of  armaments,  we  cannot  reject 
both  of  them  unless  we  have  an  acceptable  coun- 
ter-proposal to  offer.  The  British  have  shown 
their  willingness  to  meet  us  in  some  agreement. 
So,  if  the  Conference  should  break  down  on  this 
point,  the  world  will  put  the  responsibility  on  us. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   VITAL   INTERESTS    OF   JAPAN — ECONOMIC 

We  are  less  familiar  with  the  history  and 
current  thought  of  Japan  than  we  are  in  the  case 
of  our  Trans-Atlantic  cousins.  We  cannot  read 
their  newspapers  and  do  not  often  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  discuss  the  issues  with  them  in  friendly 
conversation. 

However,  there  are  certain  broad  considera- 
tions, governing  their  thinking  about  the  vital 
interests  of  their  country,  which  all  who  wish  can 
understand.  This  is  more  especially  true  in 
regard  to  their  economic  interests. 

In  so  many  ways  their  situation  is  similar  to 
that  of  the  British.  Geological  evolution  has 
arranged  for  them  an  Island  home.  They  are 
a  little  better  off  in  regard  to  food  than  the  British 
as  a  larger  proportion  of  their  people  are  still 
engaged  in  agriculture.  Their  industrialism,  with 
its  trend  away  from  the  farms  to  the  factory  sites, 
is  still  young.  But  from  the  point  of  view  of 
raw  material,  they  are  much  worse  off  than  the 

53 


54  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

British.  They  have  little  coal,  no  fuel  oil  and  very- 
little  mineral.  Their  factories  must  be  fed  almost 
entirely  from  overseas.  Their  Industrialism  is 
developing  rapidly,  producing  much  more  com- 
modities than  can  be  consumed  at  home  and 
which  must  be  sold  abroad,  drawing  ever  more 
people  into  the  towns  and  cities,  who  must  be 
fed  with  imported  foodstuffs,  making  not  only 
the  prosperity,  but  the  very  life  of  the  nation, 
more  and  more  dependent  on  regular,  uninter- 
rupted overseas  trade.  When  the  War  caused  the 
shortage  of  shipping  and  freight  rates  soared, 
there  were  immediate  and  disastrous  rice  riots 
in  Japan.  An  effective  blockade  would  starve 
them  into  submission  just  as  quickly  as  the 
English. 

Japan  has  less  responsibilities  in  the  way  of 
distant  colonies  than  Britain,  but,  while  this  may 
be  considered  as  somewhat  reducing  her  needs 
in  Naval  Armaments,  it  is  far  from  an  unmixed 
blessing,  for  it  makes  her  foreign  markets,  both 
for  import  and  export,  less  secure,  and  she  has 
no  sparsely  settled  dominions  to  absorb  her  sur- 
plus population. 

V  The  most  difficult  problem  to  judge,  which 
faces  Japan,  is  this  matter  of  her  rapidly  in- 
creasing population.  There  is  no  other  important 
phase  of  sociology,  about  which  we  know  less,  to 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— ECONOMIC     $5 

which  we  have  devoted  less  study,  than  the  birth 
rate.  Generally,  but  not  always,  the  development 
of  an  Industrial  Epoch  has  stimulated  popu- 
lation. It  did  in  England,  it  did  in  Germany. 
But  it  has  not  done  so  in  France.  Italy  is  not 
so  highly  industrialized  as  Belgium,  but  the  exu- 
berance of  her  birth  rate  causes  her  more  worry. 
The  Russians,  who  are  hardly  industrialized  at 
all,  have  been  increasing  in  numbers  tremen- 
dously. And  as  we  do  not  know  what  causes 
these  periods  of  sudden  increase  in  the  birth 
rate,  we  do  not  know  how  long  they  will  last. 
Almost  every  European  nation,  where  statistics 
are  available,  has  gone  through  recurrent  cycles 
of  great  prolificness  and  relative  sterility.  Spain, 
for  instance,  once  had  a  period  when  her  popula- 
tion broke  the  bonds  of  her  narrow  frontiers  and 
surged  out  to  the  uttermost  corners  of  the  world. 
Nobody  pretends  to  know  what  stopped  it.  Per- 
haps there  is  some  "law"  of  population,  but  if 
so  we  have  not  yet  deciphered  it.  Hardly  any 
serious  attention  has  been  given  to  the  subject, 
since  Malthus  wrote  his  pessimistic  essay  on 
Population  so  many  years  ago. 

So  we  cannot  be  sure  that  the  present  excess 
of  births  over  deaths  will  continue  indefinitely 
in  Japan,  but  the  last  fifty  years  has  seen  a  very 
rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  inhabitants. 
From  a  Western  point  of  view,  the  Islands  are 


56  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

already  terribly  over-populated.  If  this  tendency 
continues  for  a  few  decades,  an  explosive  force 
will  be  generated,  which  it  is  difficult  to  estimate 
or  overestimate.  For  the  Japanese  cannot  emi- 
grate. 

Close  at  hand  is  the  vast  continent  of  Asia, 
but  it  is  already  densely  populated  and  its  inhabi- 
tants are  habituated  to  a  lower  standard  of  liv- 
ing than  that  of  Japan.  The  movement  of  migra- 
tions is  always  in  the  opposite  direction — towards 
opportunities  of  improving  conditions.  No  one 
wants  to  leave  his  familiar  countryside  and  seek 
his  fortune  in  a  foreign  land,  unless  he  has  a 
reasonable  prospect  of  bettering  himself.  All  the 
Government-encouraged  projects  of  Japanese 
emigration  to  their  colonies  and  spheres  of  in- 
fluence in  Asia  have  failed  dismally.  There  has 
been  no  large  scale  movement  of  Japanese  settlers 
to  the  colony  of  Formosa.  The  percentage  of 
Japanese  residents  in  Korea  has  grown  only  very 
slowly  since  the  Annexation.  And  it  appears  that 
the  Japanese  colonists  in  Manchuria  are  losing 
ground  before  Chinese  immigration.  They  can- 
not compete  successfully  with  native  labor  on 
the  continent. 

If  you  reverse  this  proposition,  you  have  the 
explanation  of  why  the  Japanese  cannot  migrate 
to  the  countries  where  the  conditions  are  more 
favorable. 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— ECONOMIC     57 

There  is  so  great  a  difference  between  the  stand- 
ards of  the  Orientals  and  the  Anglo-Saxons  that 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  Canada  and  the  United 
States  have  been  forced  in  self-defense  to  exclude 
them.  Just  as  the  Japanese  laborer  cannot  live 
in  competition  with  Chinese  or  Korean  coolies, 
so  our  labor  cannot  maintain  its  accustomed 
standards  in  competition  with  them. 

The  Japanese,  who  would  like  to  emigrate, 
find  that  they  cannot  earn  a  decent  living  in 
the  countries  to  which  they  are  free  to  go  and 
that  they  are  excluded  from  the  countries  where 
they  could  hope  to  better  themselves.  "The 
number  of  Japanese  abroad  is  far  less  than  is  the 
net  increase  in  population  every  six  months." 
This  quotation  from  an  essay  by  Walter  Weyl, 
"Japan's  Thwarted  Emigration,"  presents  the 
whole  problem  with  great  vividness.  The  only 
way  for  the  Japanese  statesmen  to  care  for  this 
rapidly  growing  population — these  extra  citizens 
— is  to  create  new  jobs  where  they  can  earn 
enough  to  pay  for  imported  food.  If  they  cannot 
check  the  production  of  babies,  they  must  inten- 
sify the  production  of  commodities  and  find  mar- 
kets for  them  abroad. 

>H  *  * 

Taxation  is  another  very  serious  problem  for 
Japan.  As  in  many  other  phases  of  governmen- 
tal organization,  Japan  was  able  to  benefit  by  the 


58  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

experience  of  others.  Her  Constitution  is  not  a 
growth  like  that  of  most  of  the  Western  countries. 
Her  break  with  her  old  traditions  of  feudalism 
was  sudden  and  sweeping,  and  the  statesmen  who 
planned  her  present  Constitution  had  studied  all 
our  experiments  in  government.  They  did  not 
copy  any  one  Western  Government;  they  tried 
to  take  the  best  from  each  and  adopt  it  to  their 
own  needs.  Many  students  of  economy  have  said 
that  they  were  especially  successful  in  their  tax 
legislation,  successful,  that  is,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  raising  the  largest  possible  national 
revenue.  But  on  the  whole  her  people  are  poor 
and  it  seems  that  she  has  reached  the  limit  of 
taxation.  The  only  way  she  can  hope  to  increase 
the  income  of  the  government — if  indeed  she  is 
able  to  maintain  her  present  military  and  naval 
expenditures — is  by  profitable  enterprises  abroad, 
by  increasing  her  industrial  wealth  through  build- 
ing more  factories  or  by  the  increased  custom  re- 
ceipts from  a  growing  import  trade. 
*         *         * 

There  is  no  possible  way  for  Japan  to  take 
care  of  her  expanding  population  or  to  increase 
her  tax-yielding  wealth  unless  she  has  large  and 
assured  supplies  of  raw  materials  from  abroad. 
The  industries  for  which  she  is  traditionally  fa- 
mous do  not  lend  themselves  to  large  scale  pro- 
duction.     Silk   is    almost   the   only   specifically 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— ECONOMIC     $9 

Oriental  product  which  Japan  can  largely  in- 
crease. Modern  industry  depends  on  the  fabri- 
cation of  the  products  of  fuel  and  minerals,  and 
of  these  basic  materials  she  has  almost  none. 

Just  across  narrow  straits,  hardly  wider  than 
those  which  separate  England  from  the  Conti- 
nent, is  the  mainland  of  Asia.  Most  of  the  pearls 
and  precious  stones,  the  wrought  gold  and  lacquer, 
the  perfumes  and  spices,  which  made  the  name  of 
"Cathay"  alluring  when  Marco  Polo  was  young, 
have  been  already  snatched  up,  but  the  ancient 
realm  of  the  Great  Khan  still  holds  wealth  incal- 
culable in  such  unromantic  things  as  coal  and  oil 
and  mineral  ores.  The  riches  which  were  carried 
away  on  camel  caravans  and  in  the  sailing  ships 
of  "the  British  Company,  trading  in  the  East 
Indies"  were  only  children's  baubles  compared  to 
the  value  of  subsoil  deposits  which  could  be  dug 
up  with  steam  shovels  and  moved  in  unlovely 
trains  of  flat  cars.  And  all  this  raw  wealth, 
which  Japan  needs  so  urgently  to  keep  her 
people  alive,  is  ignored  and  neglected  by  those 
who  "own"  it. 

All  the  mining,  railroad  and  industrial  devel- 
opment of  China  has  been  done  neither  by,  nor 
for  the  benefit  of,  the  Chinese,  but  by  foreign 
"concessionaires" — more  foreign  and  from  more 
distant  homes  than  the  Japanese. 

Perhaps  it  would  be  the  most  enlightened  and 


6o  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

farsighted  policy  to  allow  all  these  deposits  of 
natural  resources  to  lie  fallow,  until  the  Chinese 
themselves  awake  to  their  value  and  begin  to 
work  them.  But  no  citizen  of  Japan,  however 
farsighted  or  enlightened,  is  going  to  accept  this 
point  of  view  for  his  country,  while  he  watches 
the  Great  Powers  of  Christendom  scrambling  for 
the  loot.  If  Britain,  with  her  vast  Dominions, 
if  France,  with  her  great  North  African  Empire, 
is  justified  in  staking  out  claims  in  China,  who 
will  expect  the  Japanese,  needing  these  resources 
so  much  more  desperately,  to  be  more  self-deny- 
ing? In  the  existing  state  of  International  Ethics, 
even  the  most  passionate  friend  of  the  Chinese 
must  admit  that  Japan  has  a  right — at  least  as 
good  a  right  as  anybody  else — to  secure  for  her- 
self access  to  these  undeveloped  resources. 

But  even  an  ardent  friend  of  the  Japanese  is 
free  to  discuss  the  methods  they  have  adopted 
towards  this  end  and  to  doubt  if  they  have  iDeen 
wise  or  effective. 

First  from  a  purely  economic  point  of  view, 
Japanese  methods  are  open  to  criticism.  They 
have  too  slavishly  followed  the  example  of  their 
Christian  rivals.  Like  them  they  have  bitten  off 
more  than  they  can  comfortably  chew.  In  gen- 
eral, the  industrial  enterprises  of  foreigners  in 
China  have  been  unintelligently  greedy.  A  group 
of  investors  has  acquired — too  often  by  bribery 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— ECONOMIC     6 1 

and  intimidation — a  rich  concession.  In  the 
normal  process  of  development  it  would  require 
a  capital  outlay  of  a  million  dollars  and  ten 
years'  work  before  it  would  begin  to  give  its 
maximum  returns.  But  after  a  few  hundred 
thousand  dollars  have  been  put  into  it  and  two 
or  three  years'  development  work  has  been  done, 
attention  is  distracted  by  the  chance  of  a  new 
concession — farther  in.  If  the  claim  is  not  staked 
out  quickly,  somebody  else  may  jump  it.  And 
so  the  first  concession  is  neglected  in  the  scramble 
to  obtain  new  ones.  Very  few  such  enterprises 
in  China  are  fully  developed.  Over-expansion  has 
been  the  rule.  The  map  is  all  plastered  over 
with  paper  concessions  of  the  dog-in-the-manger 
type.  The  owners  have  not  the  capital  to  begin 
work,  but  they  can  keep  anybody  else  from 
working. 

The  basic  Japanese  concession  in  China  is  the 
South  Manchurian  Railway,  with  all  its  subsidi- 
ary mining,  agricultural  and  trading  rights.  If 
the  Japanese  had  concentrated  all  their  energy 
on  this  project,  it  would  be  largely  prosperous. 
But  they  have  neglected  it,  in  their  eagerness  to 
establish  themselves  in  Outer  Mongolia.  Now 
the  railway  is  in  financial  difficulties.  The  Japan- 
ese banks  find  all  their  capital  tied  up  in  other 
prospectively  prosperous  but  still  undeveloped 
concessions,  and  can  give  no  assistance.     So  the 


62  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Directors  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  had 
to  appeal  to  foreign  bankers  to  help  them  out. 

The  collapse  of  the  French  Banque  Industrielle 
de  Chine  is  another  illustration  of  the  general 
situation.  Foreigners  hold  concessions  on  paper 
far  in  excess  of  the  available  capital  for  develop- 
ment. The  Japanese  have  copied  the  errors  of 
their  competitors. 

There  is  also  a  second  sound  criticism  of 
Japanese  methods  in  China.  Their  economic 
position  has  been  weakened  by  their  failure  to 
create  ''good  will."  This  is  primarily  a  matter 
of  politics,  but  it  has  had  a  striking  and  imme- 
diate effect  on  business.  Their  eagerness  to  se- 
cure control  of  raw  materials  by  methods  of  po- 
litical bullying  ruined  for  a  time  the  principal 
market  for  their  manufactured  products.  The 
Chinese  boycott  against  Japanese  goods,  due  to 
political  animosity  aroused  by  the  Twenty-one 
Demands,  was  a  severe  blow.  The  banks,  already 
over-extended  in  the  scramble  for  concessions  and 
the  wild-cat  finance  of  the  war  period,  could  not 
carry  the  exporters,  who  were  hit.  The  result 
was  the  worst  crash  in  the  financial  history  of 
Japan. 

Her  failure  to  reach  a  settlement  of  the  Shan- 
tung question  keeps  the  boycott  alive.  Methods 
of  violence  and  intimidation  may  prevent  rivals 
from   securing  concessions  which   the  Japanese 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— ECONOMIC     63 

want,  but  although  you  can  rob  people  by  force 
you  cannot  compel  them  to  buy  your  products.  A 
long  continued  and  S3^stematic  boycott  in  China 
would  surely  ruin  Japan. 

The  economic  life  of  these  two  Oriental  nations 
is  so  inexorably  interwoven,  both  for  export  and 
import,  that  it  seems  obvious  to  the  outsider  that 
Japan's  most  vital  interest  is  to  secure  the  good 
will  of  the  Chinese.  Her  one  excuse  for  not  doing 
so  is  the  bad  example  set  by  her  principal  com- 
petitors. 

There  is  still  another  fair  criticism  of  Japan- 
ese commercial  activity  in  China;  it  has  not 
tended  to  strengthen  her  credit  in  the  foreign 
markets  where  she  must  occasionally  go  for 
loans.  The  psychology  of  credit  is  one  of  the 
most  subtle  of  unsolved  problems.  It  costs  the 
Japanese  people  a  great  deal  to  pay  higher  inter- 
est on  their  Imperial  Bonds  than  some  other 
countries.  The  South  Manchurian  Railway  does 
not  find  "money  cheap."  That  the  bankers  of 
Japan  are  fully  ahve  to  this  problem  is  indicated 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  on  the  whole  more  con- 
ciliatory in  the  Consortium  negotiations  than 
some  of  the  Japanese  politicians. 

But  the  future  welfare  of  the  Japanese  eco- 
nomic life  is  more  especially  dependent  on  good 
relations  with  China.  If  this  Conference  at 
Washington  can  do  something  to  civilize  foreign 


64  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

commercial  enterprise  in  China — and  the  Western 
Powers  could  do  a  great  deal  by  example — it 
would  accomplish  much  for  the  Peace  of  the 
Orient.  A  really  cordial  entente  between  Japan 
and  China,  making  possible  friendly  cooperation 
in  industrial  development,  would  be  mutually 
advantageous  and  to  the  advantage  of  all  the 
world. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  VITAL  INTERESTS   OF  JAPAN — POLITICAL 

There  is  general  sympathy  in  the  Western 
world  for  Japan's  economic  difficulties,  but  much 
less  for  her  political  activities.  They  are  harder 
to  understand. 

Of  late  the  Japanese  have  put  in  the  forefront 
of  their  claims  the  "Recognition  of  Racial 
Equality."  Very  few  students  of  international 
relations  have  been  inclined  to  consider  this  a 
"vital  interest"  or  even  a  serious  issue  of  practical 
politics. 

The  emphasis  which  the  Japanese  Delegation 
at  Paris  put  on  Racial  Equality  has  generally 
been  described  as  a  "smoke  screen,"  intended  to 
veil  the  affair  of  Shantung.  It  is  a  threadbare 
trick  of  traditional  diplomacy  to  ask  very  firmly 
for  something  you  do  not  expect  to  get,  so  that 
finally  you  may  accept  as  a  compromise,  and  with 
the  appearance  of  gracious  concession,  the  thing 
you  really  wanted. 

The  world  has  recognized  Japanese  superiority 
over  most  nations  by  giving  them  a  seat  among 

65 


66  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

the  Great  Powers  on  the  Supreme  Council.  Their 
capacity  in  military  matters  is  admittedly  equal 
to  any  and  superior  to  most.  Although  their 
industrialism  is  barely  fifty  years  old,  their  com- 
merce is  competing  on  equal  terms  in  the  world's 
markets,  and  matches  are  not  the  only  commodity 
in  which  they  are  out-competing  most  of  us.  If 
we  consider  the  thrift  and  industry  of  their  un- 
skilled laborers,  their  superiority  from  a  purely 
economic  point  of  view  is  obvious  and  appalling. 
We  pass  Exclusion  Acts  against  them,  not  because 
we  look  down  on  them,  but  because  we  are  afraid 
of  them.  There  is  no  occasion  for  any  "recogni- 
tion" of  equality  in  these  matters.  The  Japanese 
already  have  the  rest  of  the  world  on  a  worried 
defensive. 

However,  if  they  mean  by  the  phrase  that  there 
shall  not  be  any  discrimination  against  Asiatics 
in  the  domestic  legislation  of  other  countries,  they 
are  ignoring  reahties  and  asking  for  the  moon.  If 
Mr.  Wilson  at  Paris  had  been  willing  to  play 
unscrupulous  politics,  he  might  have  supported 
the  Japanese  contention — with  perfect  assurance 
that  the  onus  of  refusing  their  request  would  fall 
on  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  The  race  question  is  more 
embarrassing  for  the  British  than  for  us.  Their 
empire  is  heterogeneous  in  the  extreme.  Besides 
the  stock  of  the  United  Kingdom,  there  are  the 
mixed  races  of  India,  the  city  dwelling  Copts  and 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— POLITICAL       67 

nomadic  Bedawi  of  Egypt,  the  naked  blacks  of 
Uganda  and  the  primitive  tribes  of  Australasia. 
Britain  has  gone  farther  than  any  other  nation 
towards  establishing  equality  before  the  law  of  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men,  but  she  cannot  accept 
any  abstract  civic  and  social  equality  for  all  this 
motley  assembly.  She  cannot  even  grant  com- 
plete freedom  of  migration  within  her  own  do- 
mains. AustraHa  is  just  as  intolerant  of  British 
subjects  from  India  and  Africa  as  of  aliens  from 
Japan. 

Any  nation,  Japan  just  as  quickly  as  we,  will 
protect  itself  by  Exclusion  Laws  against  a  threat- 
ened flood  of  alien  immigrants  which  might  under- 
mine the  standard  of  living  to  which  its  own 
people  were  accustomed.  The  Japanese  states- 
men know  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  rela- 
tive merit  of  different  races.  They  also  know 
that  we  are  not  inspired  by  any  desire  to  affront 
them.  In  the  conversations  which  preceded  the 
Root-Takahira  Agreement,  in  the  more  recent 
discussions  at  Washington  between  Mr.  Morris 
and  Baron  Shidehara,  they  received  every  proof 
of  our  desire  to  deal  with  the  subject  in  a  spirit 
of  courtesy  and  complete  equality,  as  is  right  be- 
tween one  great  nation  and  another. 

The  politicians  could  quiet  the  popular  agita- 
tion on  the  subject  in  Japan  very  quickly  by  a 
clear    statement    of    the    remarkable    cordiality 


68  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

with  which  Japanese  evolution  from  obscurity 
to  a  favored  place  among  the  five  Superior  Powers 
has  been  greeted  by  all  the  world. 

The  Japanese  did  not  gain  any  new  friends, 
nor  any  added  respect  among  their  old  friends, 
by  the  use  they  made  of  this  issue  at  Paris.  They 
will  be  ill-advised  if  they  raise  it  at  Washington. 
Insistence  on  it  will  be  generally  interpreted  as 
an  attempt  to  throw  a  wooden  shoe  into  the 
machinery.  It  might  give  them  a  chance  to  "save 
face,"  in  case  they  want  to  bolt  the  Conference, 
but  it  certainly  will  not  be  a  gesture  of  concili- 
ation. 

Most  of  all  Japan  has  lost  sympathy  in  Amer- 
ica and  Europe  through  her  recent  political  activ- 
ity in  China.  For  many  years  Cassandras  have 
been  "foretelling  mischief,"  loud  in  their  accusa- 
tions of  Japan's  sinister  plans  in  China.  But  just 
as  the  Athenians  shrugged  their  shoulders  at  the 
Philippics  of  Demosthenes  and  believed  that  the 
Macedonian  Menace  was  grossly  exaggerated,  so 
we  have  found  it  more  comfortable  to  take  these 
charges  with  a  grain  of  salt. 

However,  everybody  who  wanted  to  be  com- 
fortable was  rudely  jolted  by  the  publication  of 
Japan's  Twenty-one  Demands  on  China.  A  good 
many  books  have  been  printed  about  this  famous 
diplomatic  document,  and  there  is  no  need  of 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— POLITICAL      69 

going  over  all  the  unsavory  details.  The  nub  of 
the  matter  was  that  this  official  act  of  the  Japanese 
Government  demonstrated  that  the  most  extreme 
jingoes  were  then  in  control  of  the  Foreign  Office. 

Some  of  us  had  read  von  Bernhardi's  book  on 
"The  Next  War/'  when  it  was  first  pubhshed,  be- 
fore the  fatal  August  of  1914.  We  comforted  our- 
selves with  the  belief  that  he  was  the  spokesman 
of  only  an  uninfluential  minority.  But  when  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Empire  announced  in  the  Reich- 
stag that  Belgium  was  to  be  invaded,  there  could 
not  be  any  further  illusion  about  the  strength  of 
the  Military  Party  in  Germany. 

This  is  the  real  import  of  the  incident  of  the 
Twenty-one  Demands.  They  were  unconscion- 
ably bad  in  detail,  but  the  fundamental  signifi- 
cance lay  in  the  fact  that  those  who  believed  in 
such  rank  aggression  could  have  their  way  with 
the  Government. 

The  Ministry  which  was  responsible  has  fallen, 
and  its  policy  has  been  condemned  on  the  floor 
of  the  Diet  in  Tokio.  But,  despite  fine  words, 
neither  the  Chinese  nor  the  outside  world  has 
been  able  to  notice  any  marked  change  in  Japan- 
ese political  methods,  nor  any  such  significant 
transfers  of  personnel,  as  would  be  expected  if 
the  resolution  to  pursue  a  new  policy  were  sin- 
cere. 

Inevitably  unpleasant  questions  arise.    What  is 


70  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Japan  gunning  for  in  China?  What  is  the  objec- 
tive of  all  these  corrupt  intrigues  and  sword- 
clankings?  Japanese  publicists  and  statesmen 
have  been  reticent  in  explanation,  or  have  con- 
tented themselves  with  unsatisfying  generali- 
ties. It  is  therefore  necessary  to  give  attention 
to  the  explanations  offered  by  others.  These 
fall  under  two  headings — Imperial  Ambitions  and 
Fear. 

Many  Europeans  and  Americans  have  returned 
from  the  Orient  convinced,  with  a  fanaticism  past 
argument,  that  Japan  has  matured  and  detailed 
plans  for  the  political  subjugation  of  China,  as 
a  first  step  in  the  regimenting  of  the  Asiatic 
hordes  for  a  final  assault  on  Western  Civilization. 
They  claim  that  there  is  a  semi-secret  society  in 
Japan,  called  the  Black  Dragon,  or  the  Scarlet 
Python — or  some  such  sinisterly  colored  reptile — 
of  which  all  prominent  Japanese  are  members  and 
which  is  not  only  obsessed  by  this  lurid  dream, 
but  is  working  out  the  practical  details.  It  is, 
they  insist,  an  imminent  danger. 

Now,  although  the  number  of  Westerners  who 
believe  all  this  is  considerable,  it  is  absurd.  The 
Japanese  have  not  shown  any  marked  genius  for 
colonial  administration  and  we,  Anglo-Saxons, 
who  consider  ourselves  rather  better  at  it  than 
the  average,  always  have  to  begin  by  disarming 
our  subject  races.    We  could  not  start  construe- 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— POLITICAL      7 1 

tive  work  in  the  Philippines,  until  we  had  taken 
their  guns  away  from  them.  After  more  than 
a  hundred  years  in  India,  Britain  was  able  to 
bring  only  a  very  small  contingent  of  native 
troops  into  the  Great  War.  I  have  not  seen  any 
exact  figures,  but  I  doubt  if  the  British  find  it 
expedient  to  allow  one  in  five  thousand  of  their 
subject  peoples  to  bear  arms.  We  will  not  have 
to  worry  about  a  vast  Chinese  Army,  under  the 
orders  of  the  General  Staff  at  Tokio,  until  we 
hear  that  the  Japanese  have  found  themselves 
able  to  arm  and  drill  a  noticeable  contingent  from 
Korea. 

There  remains  the  other  possible  explanation. 
It  is  generally  agreed  that  quite  as  much  turpi- 
tude is  caused  by  fear  as  by  aggressive  greed.  Put 
yourself  in  the  position  of  a  thoughtful,  patri- 
otic citizen  of  Japan,  look  about  on  the  world  of 
today  and  try  to  peer  out  into  the  future.  The 
prospect  is  not  reassuring.  Japan  is  over- 
crowded. Even  with  increased  population  she 
cannot  greatly — certainly  not  indefinitely — ex- 
pand her  Army  and  Navy.  Across  the  narrow 
seas  there  is  this  vast  conglomeration  of  Chinese — 
400  millions  of  them  at  least.  Suppose  that  China, 
moving  more  slowly  because  of  her  bulk,  goes 
through  an  evolution  in  the  next  hundred  years 
comparable  to  that  of  Japan  in  the  last  half  cen- 
tury.    Suppose  that  the  United  States  acts  as 


72  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

big  brother  and  presides  over  this  process  of  re- 
juvenation. Japan  will  be  a  very  small  nut  in 
the  jaws  of  an  immense  nut-cracker.  I  do  not 
see  how  any  Japanese  can  think  of  the  probable 
development  of  China  without  grave  misgivings 
— without  serious  temptation  to  thwart  it. 

Turn  for  a  moment  from  this  little  known  and 
unfamiliar  East  to  the  nearer  lands  across  the 
Atlantic.  There  is  a  striking  analogy  between 
the  Sino-Japanese  situation  and  the  conflicting 
interests  of  Germany  and  France.  There  are 
about  40  million  French,  with  little  hope  of  in- 
crease, while  across  the  Rhine  there  is  a  growing 
population  of  Teutons  already  twice  as  numerous. 
Can  we  expect  France  to  have  any  honest  desire 
for  the  regeneration  of  Germany?  Not  unless 
there  is  some  organization  of  the  nations  which 
effectively  guarantees  her  from  attack.  Failing 
such  an  assurance  her  only  hope  of  safety  lies  in 
keeping  Germany  weak,  in  stirring  up  enmities 
among  the  nations  of  Europe.  If  the  Teutons 
and  the  Slavs  should  unite  there  would  be  short 
shrift  for  the  Latins. 

So  it  is  in  the  Far  East.  When  we  talk  of 
strengthening  China,  the  Japanese  suspect  us  of 
trying  to  build  up  an  ally  for  use  against  them. 
Their  vital  interest  of  territorial  security  is  at 
stake.  They  certainly  have  more  reason  to  be 
jumpy  on  the  subject  than  we  have  over  "foreign 


THE  VITAL  INTERESTS  OF  JAPAN— POLITICAL      73 

influences"  in  Mexico.  So  far  they  have  con- 
trived no  way  to  meet  this  menace,  except  by 
intrigues  in  China  to  prevent  her  reorganization. 

The  Chinese  have  a  fable  which  is  apropos. 
Once  upon  a  time  a  half-grown  Fox  found  a 
baby  Lion  and  adopted  it  as  a  playfellow.  At 
first  the  Fox,  because  of  its  superior  age,  could 
have  its  own  way.  But  as  the  Lion  cub  grew,  and 
it  grew  so  much  faster  than  the.  Fox,  it  gathered 
strength,  and  the  Fox  began-'to  worry  about  the 
future.  "Who  can  wonder"  the  fable  ends,  "that 
the  Fox  lost  its  temper  and  snapped  at  the  Lion?" 

The  Japanese  are  too  proud  to  admit  this  as  an 
explanation  of  their  activities  in  China.  But  we 
may  be  sure  that  always  in  the  back  of  the  heads 
of  the  members  of  the  Japanese  Delegation  at 
Washington  will  be  the  realization  that  it  may 
be  very  dangerous  for  their  country  if  any  un- 
friendly nation  develops  the  potential  strength 
of  China. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

china's  vital  interests 

No  amount  of  pomp  and  ceremony,  no  amiable 
fictions,  can  disguise  the  fact  that  China  will  at- 
tend the  Washington  Conference  in  the  role  of  a 
minor  among  its  Guardians.  An  ancient  Mon- 
archy, too  decrepit  to  defend  its  interests  against 
aggressive  foreigners,  has  fallen  before  a  very 
juvenile  Revolution,  not  yet  grown  up  to  dignity 
and  power.  The  Celestial  Empire  of  the  Manchus 
was  the  Sick  Man  of  Asia.  The  young  Republic 
is  the  enfant  terrible.  It  has  not  yet  struck  its 
pace  nor  found  its  place.  Nobody  knows  how 
fast  it  will  go,  nor  the  direction  it  will  take.  Any- 
thing, so  uncertain,  is  terrible  in  the  staid  society 
of  nations. 

Mr.  Bland  has  perhaps  been  too  severely  sar- 
castic about  Young  China  in  his  recent  volume 
on  ''China,  Korea  and  Japan,"  but  even  if  exag- 
gerated his  bill  of  complaint  shows  the  nature  of 
China's  troubles.  Two  groups  of  not  very  ex- 
perienced politicians — one  in  the  North,  the  other 

74 


CHINA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  75 

in  the  South — claim  each  to  be  the  Constitutional 
Government  of  the  Republic  and  carry  on  a  Civil 
War,  which  consists  largely  of  mutual  recrimina- 
tions and  attempts  to  undermine  the  loyalty  of 
the  opposing  troops — which  do  not  very  often 
meet  in  battle.  While  this  forensic  conflict  rages 
between  Pekin  and  Canton,  the  real  powers  of 
government  are  wielded  by  local  satraps — the 
Provincial  Tuchuns — who  are  frankly  more  inter- 
ested in  emoluments  than  in  the  Res  Publica. 
Neither  the  Government  of  the  North  nor  that  of 
the  South  can  give  its  edicts  force  through  any 
large  territory.  The  strength  which  results  from 
National  Unity — urged  by  the  ancient  sages  as 
well  as  by  modern  advisers — does  not  now  exist 
in   China. 

It  was  a  wise  move  to  invite  China  to  send 
representatives  to  join  in  the  discussion  of  Far 
Eastern  Affairs,  but  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake 
to  take  them  too  seriously.  It  was  wise  because 
it  shows  our  good  will  towards  China  and  we  want 
her  good  will.  It  was  wise  because  of  its  edu- 
cational value.  But  the  Delegation  will  not  in 
any  true  sense  represent  the  vast  mass  of  Chi- 
nese; they  will  be  the  agents  of  the  cHque  now  in 
control  at  Pekin.  We  may  be  quite  sure  that  at 
least  half  of  the  Chinese  will  denounce  them 
as  traitors,  taking  orders — and  bribes — from 
Tokio. 


76  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Their  position  will  not  be  unlike  that  of  the 
Turks  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1879.  Their 
fate  will  be  the  principal  subject  of  discussion, 
but  they  will  have  to  rely  on  others  to  defend 
their  interests.  It  is  not  even  probable  that  they 
will  be  able  to  define  their  interests  convincingly. 

They  will  arrive  at  the  Conference  with  a  thick 
portfolio  full  of  complaints — justified  complaints 
against  the  high-handed  aggressions  of  more 
powerful  nations.  But  judging  from  past  per- 
formances, it  is  not  probable  that  they  will  be 
helpful  in  suggesting  any  practical  and  construc- 
tive measures  to  improve  the  situation. 

The  Destiny  of  China,  more  strikingly  than 
with  almost  any  other  nation,  will  be  determined 
by  her  own  people.  Her  undeveloped  power 
in  men,  in  material  and  wealth  is  tremendous. 
So  is  her  present  disorganization.  There  is  very 
little  that  outsiders  can  do  to  help  her,  unless  she 
learns  to  help  herself.  And  when  once  she  does 
acquire  cohesion  she  will  not  need  any  outside 
help.  But  this  internal  weakness  is  the  phase 
of  her  troubles  which  her  representatives  are 
least  disposed  to  discuss;  they  are  more  likely 
to  demand  a  paper  recognition  of  unreal  "sov- 
ereignty," than  to  seek  tlie  means  to  make  the 
sovereignty  real;  more  likely  to  complain  of  the 
abuses  of  extra-territoriality,  than  to  improve  the 
administration  of  justice  so  that  foreigners  would 


CHINA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  77 

have  assurance  of  protection.  They  will  prob- 
ably demand  that  respect  which  other  nations 
have  had  to  win. 

It  is  difficult  to  define  the  real  interests  of 
China,  because  in  this  matter,  as  in  others,  they 
are  a  house  divided.  But  there  would  be  little 
dispute  that  the  problem  which  overshadows  all 
others  for  them  is  their  relation  to  Japan.  Is  it 
to  be  friendship  and  collaboration  or  hatred  and 
conflict? 

Recently  a  young  Chinese  student  told  me  that 
he  hoped  the  outcome  of  this  Conference  would 
be  the  formal  annexation  by  Japan  of  Manchuria 
and  Shantung.  "That,"  he  said,  "would  give  us 
just  the  Alsace-Lorraine  we  need  to  bring  about 
national  unity.  We  could  stimulate  a  hatred 
of  Japan,  a  desire  for  revenge  which  would  bring 
us  together  as  one  man — as  surely  as  the  German 
menace  has  united  France.  And  then,"  he  ended 
gleefully,  "when  the  inevitable  war  breaks  out 
between  you  and  Japan,  you  could  be  sure  that 
every  Japanese  in  China  would  be  killed  within 
three  days."  When  I  pointed  out  that  this  Con- 
ference was  called  in  the  hope  of  avoiding  war, 
of  reducing  armaments,  he  lost  all  interest. 
While  his  was  a  foolish  and  reckless  proposal,  it 
is  based  on  a  theory  held — in  somewhat  more 
moderate  terms — by  many  Chinese.  It  is  rather 
like  the  old  Fenian  slogan — "England's  distress 


78  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

is  Ireland's  opportunity."  The  Chinese  of  this 
school  advocate  playing  America  off  against 
Japan,  seeing  nothing  but  gain  for  themselves  in 
the  anticipated  conflict.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
the  Chinese  Delegation  at  Washington  will  not 
act  on  this  theory,  intentionally  troubling  the 
waters,  in  their  eagerness  to  take  home  a  great 
fish. 

*         *         * 

But  it  is  a  serious  error  to  think  that  "Young 
China"  is  wholly  anti-Japanese.  Many  more 
Chinese  of  "Foreign  Learning" — the  leaders  of 
the  Student  Movement — have  been  educated  in 
Japan  than  have  gone  to  the  schools  of  the  West. 
And  even  if  Japan  is  today  the  worst  offender 
against  China's  interests,  they  realize  that  she  is 
only  tardily  following  the  example  of  the  nations 
which  call  themselves  Christian. 

Of  course  the  great  illiterate  mass  of  Chinese 
are  utterly — if  not  bhssfully — indifferent  to  the 
rival  claims  of  those  who  scramble  for  conces- 
sions. Among  the  small  minority,  who  are  inter- 
ested in  their  country's  place  in  the  world,  those 
who  call  themselves  Pro-Japanese  are  quite  as 
numerous  as  those  who  are  Anti.  The  frequency 
with  which  some  of  the  "leaders"  switch  from 
one  party  to  the  other  indicates  that  there  is 
a  great  deal  to  be  said  for  each  side  and  that 
Public  Opinion  in  China  has  not  definitely  de- 
cided between  them. 


CHINA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  79 

One  thing  which  generally  surprises  the  West- 
erner is  to  find  that  even  the  Chinese,  who  are 
the  most  angry  and  bitter  against  their  fellow 
countrymen,  whom  they  accuse  of  taking  orders 
from  Tokio,  are  not  really  afraid  of  the  Japanese. 
The  learning  of  their  schools  is  primarily  in  the 
Classics  and  History.  They  know  how  often  they 
have  been  conquered  and  how  they  have  always 
come  out  on  top.  Genghis  Khan  was  not  the  first, 
nor  the  last,  invader  who  boasted  of  having  sub- 
dued China  and  in  the  end  was  taken  captive 
by  her.  They  regard  the  Manchus,  for  instance, 
not  as  alien  masters,  but  as  a  barbarian  people 
to  whom  they  taught  civilization.  And  so  the 
Chinese  of  today  are  not  really  afraid  of  Japan — 
knowledge  of  their  past  has  given  them  faith  in 
the  future. 

A  prominent  Chinese  official  is  quoted  as  having 
said:  "We  ought  to  ask  Japan  to  conquer  us.  She 
would  give  us  a  good  government,  teach  us  all  the 
now  learning  which  has  made  her  strong,  and 
when  the  lesson  is  over,  when  Japan  has  taught 
us  all  she  can — we  will  be  strong  enough  to  brush 
her  aside." 

Something  like  this  is  probably  the  natural 
trend  of  events.  It  was  the  sword  of  Caesar  that 
brought  civilization  to  Britain,  and  Bernard  Shaw 
used  to  say  that  it  was  a  misfortune  for  England 
that  she  had  not  been  conquered  by  Napoleon. 


8o  THE  A  B  CS  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Some  one  has  spoken  of  the  Czechs  as  "Prussian- 
ized Slavs."  And  certainly  a  comparison  of  their 
orderly  and  efficient  Legions  in  Siberia  with  the 
Russian  Army  of  Kolchak  indicated  that  they 
had  learned  some  valuable  lessons  in  the  long 
years  they  suffered  under  Teuton  oppression. 
Perhaps,  if  Nature  were  left  to  herself  the  only 
way  she  could  think  of  to  regenerate  China  would 
be  to  let  the  Japanese  rule  her  for  a  half  century 
or  so. 

But  we  are  not  content  to  let  Nature  take  her 
course.  The  one  reason  for  this  Conference  at 
Washington  is  to  attempt  to  persuade  "natural 
man,"  with  his  instinctive  love  of  arms,  to  be- 
come more  "civilized."  We  cannot  be  con- 
tent to  allow  the  civilization  of  the  East  to  wait 
on  the  crude  old  processes  of  war.  We  must 
strive  to  arrange  matters  so  that  Japan  and  the 
other  nations  can  carry  on  their  educational  work 
in  China  without  shooting  her  up.  We  must  try 
to  furnish  China  with  what  she  needs  without 
making  her  pay  too  heavily. 

The  old  maxim  says  that  it  takes  two  to  make 
a  quarrel;  it  is  even  more  true  that  it  takes  two 
to  make  a  friendship.  And  the  latter  is  much 
the  more  difficult.  Sudden  and  shortlived  anger 
will  start  a  fight,  the  establishment  of  cordial 
cooperation  is  the  work  of  slow  reason.  It  re- 
quires continuity  of  effort  as  well  as  good  will. 
But  good  will  on  both  sides  is  the  condition  pre- 


CHINA'S  VITAL  INTERESTS  8 1 

cedent.  The  Conference  at  Washington  has  a 
large  opportunity  for  beneficent  activity  in  trying 
to  bring  China  and  Japan  towards  the  spirit  of 
Entente. 

Once  her  relations  with  Japan  were  put  on  a 
secure  basis,  China  could  proceed  with  her  inter- 
nal reorganization.  First  of  all  comes  finance, 
more  of  the  money  collected  in  taxes  must  be  re- 
turned to  the  people  in  public  service,  and  less 
of  it  go  into  the  pockets  of  officials.  The  Repub- 
lic will  not  deserve  respect  until  it  has  disbanded 
the  irregular  troops  of  the  Provincial  Tuchuns 
and  built  up  a  loyal  National  Police  Force  ade- 
quate for  the  task  of  restoring  authority.  Then 
China  needs  all  sorts  of  transportation  facilities, 
railroads,  canals,  highways.  Also  improved 
mails  and  telegraphs.  It  is  only  with  a  good 
network  of  communications  that  national  unity 
can  be  developed.  Educational  facilities  demand 
attention.  The  old  classical  examinations  have 
been  abandoned  and  no  new  national  system  in- 
stalled. China  does  not  so  much  need  foreign 
schools,  where  Lincoln  and  Gladstone  will  be  held 
up  as  models,  as  her  own  native  schools,  where 
the  fine  heritage  of  her  antique  culture  will  be 
revered. 

In  such  matters  the  foreigners  can  aid  with 
advice  and  in  some  cases  with  capital  and  trained 
experts,  but  most  of  such  work  will  have  to  be 
done  by  the  Chinese  themselves. 


82  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

The  one  most  valuable  thing  that  the  foreign 
nations  could  do  to  help  China  would  be  to  invent 
some  way  to  restrain  their  own  citizens  from 
corrupting  Chinese  officials  with  bribes. 

*         *         * 

This  Conference  at  Washington  will  accom- 
plish more  for  the  cause  of  Peace,  if  it  works  out 
plans  of  active  cooperation,  than  if  it  contents 
itself  with  pledges  not  to  do  this  and  not  to  do 
that.  Much  can  be  accomplished  along  these 
lines  by  the  Consortium,  if  all  the  Four  Powers 
will  get  behind  it  heartily.  But  cooperation  im- 
plies a  fair  sharing  of  the  profits  and  we  cannot 
expect  any  one  to  come  into  the  Consortium 
wholeheartedly  unless  it  offers  them  quite  as 
much  as  they  could  expect  to  get  by  playing  a 
lone  hand.  But  if  the  agreement  can  be  made 
mutually  satisfactory,  there  is  fair  hope  that 
Japan  will  gradually,  through  such  collaboration, 
lose  her  suspicious  fear  of  a  China  controlled  by 
hostile  foreigners.  There  is  very  little  that  the 
other  nations  can  accomplish  for  the  good  of 
China  if  the  Japanese  are  working  against  them. 

Here  also  a  great  deal  depends  on  China.  So 
far  the  Consortium  has  marked  time,  because  the 
Chinese  were  suspicious.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
their  delegates  will  go  home  from  the  Conference 
thoroughly  convinced  that  this  offer  of  assistance 
is  sincere  and  disposed  to  urge  the  cooperation 
of  their  people. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  INTERESTS   OF   THE   OTHER  POWERS 

Certain  of  the  smaller  nations  have  been  invited 
to  send  delegates  to  the  Conference.  They  will 
take  part  in  the  discussions  when  matters  affect- 
ing their  interests  are  on  the  Agenda.  Holland 
is  the  country  most  concerned,  because  of  her 
large  colonial  holdings  in  the  East  Indies  and 
her  profitable  Oriental  trade.  She  is  also  inter- 
ested in  the  fate  of  the  Island  of  Yap,  as  one  of 
her  cables  terminates  there.  Portugal  controls 
the  Treaty  Port  of  Macao  and  Belgium  has  some 
industrial  concessions  in  China.  But  the  partici- 
pation of  these  lesser  Powers  will  probably  be 
limited  to  details  and  will  have  little  iniluence 
on  the  major  questions  of  policy,  on  which  the 
fate  of  the  Conference  will  hang. 

The  role  which  France  and  Italy  will  play 
has  excited  much  more  speculation.  The  Sen- 
ate Resolution  proposed  a  Tripartite  Conference 
of  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  the  United  States 
to  discuss  the  limitation  of  Naval  Armaments. 
Mr.  Hughes  sent  invitations  to  "the  Principal 

83 


84  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Associated  Powers"  and  expanded  the  scope  of 
the  Conference  to  include  discussion  of  the  Paci- 
fic Problems.  In  view  of  the  limited  interests  of 
France  and  Italy  in  Far  Eastern  affairs  and  their 
lesser  interest  in  naval  rivalries,  their  invitation 
caused  some  surprise.  It  has  been  suggested  that 
the  Department  of  State,  in  reaffirming  in  this 
manner  a  continued  solidarity  of  interest  with 
the  nations  which  had  been  associated  with  us 
in  the  War,  wished  to  counteract  the  contrary 
impression  which  had  been  created  by  the  Sep- 
arate Peace  with  Germany. 

France  has  more  extensive  interests  in  the 
Far  East  than  Italy.  "Indo-Chine"  is  a  large 
and  prosperous  colony  which  she  annexed  after 
a  war  with  China.  From  it  as  a  base  she  has 
staked  out  a  "sphere  of  influence"  of  ambitious 
proportions  in  Soutliern  China.  The  recent 
crash  of  the  Banque  Industrielle  de  Chine  indi- 
cates that  in  the  scramble  for  concessions,  the 
French  have  over-extended  on  their  available 
capital,  even  more  than  the  Japanese.  France 
is  also  a  member  of  the  Four  Power  Chinese  Con- 
sortium. So  her  "interests"  in  the  Orient,  while 
not  so  great  as  those  of  Britain  and  Japan,  are 
considerably  larger  than  Italy's. 

Both  France  and  Italy  are,  like  us,  protection- 
ist countries,  and  their  attitude  towards  the  Open 
Door  will  probably  be  ambiguous.     They  would 


THE  INTERESTS  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS       8$ 

welcome  equal  opportunities  for  their  trade  in 
all  markets  where  they  have  not  yet  established 
a  favored  position  for  themselves.  But,  just  like 
us,  they  would  be  inclined  to  think  that  any 
proposal  to  apply  the  Open  Door  Policy  in  their 
own  dependencies  was  running  a  good  idea  into 
the  ground. 

In  regard  to  the  Limitation  of  Naval  Arma- 
ments, France's  interest,  like  that  of  most  other 
nations,  is  very  close  to  ours.  The  Freedom  of 
the  Seas,  based  on  a  generally  accepted  Code 
of  Sea  Law,  sanctioned  by  the  consent  of  those 
to  be  governed  by  it,  inevitably  seems  more  at- 
tractive than  the  present  uncertainty,  to  all  coun- 
tries that  cannot  hope  for  naval  supremacy.  We 
are  not  the  only  country  which  believes  in  the 
Freedom  of  the  Seas.  In  most  International  Con- 
ferences to  discuss  Sea  Law,  Britain  has  found 
herself  alone  against  all  the  other  nations  in 
opposing  our  contention. 

Italy's  position  in  regard  to  Naval  Disarma- 
ment will  not  be  quite  the  same  as  France's,  for 
her  situation  is  different.  With  the  great  fleets 
of  Britain,  America  and  Japan  she  has  small 
concern.  Her  problems  are  nearer  home  and  on, 
a  smaller  scale.  She  is  more  interested  in  the 
Greek  Fleet  and  Naval  Supremacy  in  the  near 
Eastern  waters. 

The  problem  of  Armaments  for  both  France 


86  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

and  Italy  is  primarily  a  matter  of  land  forces  and 
European  issues.  If  we  may  judge  from  the 
official  statements  of  the  pre-Conference  period 
there  is  no  intention  to  discuss  these  questions  at 
Washington.  They  can  hardly  be  touched  upon 
without  going  profoundly  into  the  problems  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  If  France  is  to  be  left 
to  face  Germany  single-handed,  it  is  utterly 
futile  to  propose  disarmament  to  her.  And  Italy 
also  has  a  serious  problem  on  her  hands  in  the 
unstable  conditions  across  the  Adriatic.  None 
of  the  Balkan  States  were  contented  with  the 
boundaries  given  them  at  Paris.  If  France  has 
the  German  Menace  as  an  excuse  for  maintain- 
ing heavy  military  expenditures,  which  she  can- 
not afford,  Italy  has  the  Slavs. 
*         *         * 

However,  although  their  interests  in  the  Far 
East  and  in  Naval  Disarmaments  are  relatively 
slight,  the  French  and  Italian  Delegations  may 
play  an  important  role  at  Washington. 

First  of  all,  despite  the  numerous  irritations 
between  their  people — similar  to  the  occasional 
frictions  between  us  and  our  English  cousins — the 
Latin  Sisters  will  act  as  a  unit  to  prevent,  if 
possible,  the  formation  of  an  Anglo-American 
Alliance — even  if  Japan  is  included.  When 
Lloyd  George  proposes  that  we  come  in  with 
them  in  alliance  with  Japan,  he  always  takes 


THE  INTERESTS  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS       87 

pains  to  insist  that  its  object  is  altruistic,  to  pre- 
serve the  peace  of  the  world.  American  propa- 
gandists of  the  "Engiish-Speaking-Union"  also 
talk  as  if  all  the  world  would  benefit  by  such  a 
combination  and  that  no  one  could  take  offense. 
It  has  always  been  the  custom  to  "prepare"  Pub- 
lic Opinion  with  similar  altruistic  oratory  for 
every  Alliance.  Bismarck's  Triple  Alliance — 
Germany,  Austria,  Italy — was  announced  as  an 
effort  to  preserve  peace.  The  Entente,  which 
was  formed  to  balance  it,  gave  out  similar  ad- 
vance notices.  But  AlKances,  no  matter  how 
bedecked  with  fine  phrases,  have  always  turned 
out  to  be  very  selfish  affairs.  What  we  talk  of  as 
Anglo-American  cooperation  is  described  by  the 
rest  of  the  world  as  the  "Menace  of  Anglo-Saxon 
Domination" — "The  English-speaking  Imperial- 
ism." It  is  a  favorite  theme  of  present-day  polit- 
ical writers  in  Germany.  It  is  the  secret  fear 
of  Latin  and  Slav. 

France,  having  no  faith  in  a  League  of  Nations 
from  which  we  abstain,  is  today  seeking  Alliances 
with  the  Slav  nations,  partly  out  of  fear  that 
Germany  may  become  dangerously  strong  again, 
partly  to  find  support  to  oppose  British  hegemony 
in  Europe.  If  we  sign  up  with  the  British,  the 
Latins  and  Slavs  will  almost  certainly  form  a 
solid  block  and  quickly  compose  their  difficulties 
with  the  Teutons.     It  may  be  unreasonable  of 


88  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

them  to  suspect  our  Anglo-Saxon  motives,  but 
they  do,  and  they  do  not  want  to  be  dominated 
by  us. 

Naturally,  when  we  try  to  balance  the  argu- 
ments, pro  and  con,  in  regard  to  Lloyd  George's 
proposal  of  an  Anglo-American-Japanese  Alli- 
ance, we  are  not  frightened  at  the  prospect  of 
being  dominated.  The  problem  appears  to  us 
rather  as  a  question  of  whether  we  could  expect 
sufficient  gains  to  compensate  for  the  responsi- 
bility involved  in  helping  to  keep  the  British 
Empire  together,  holding  the  hd  on  India  and 
Egypt,  supporting  Anglo-Japanese  policies  in 
Asia  in  possible  conflicts  with  a  regenerated  Rus- 
sia, etc.  But  it  does  not  look  so  simple  to  those 
who  have  not  been  invited  to  join  the  combina- 
tion. 

It  will  be  a  great  advantage  to  have  at  the 
Council  Table  in  Washington  friends  who  will 
be  able  to  show  us  how  this  proposal  looks  from 
the  outside.  Perhaps  we  will  decide  to  give  this 
Triple  Alliance  a  try — it  certainly  is  a  strong 
combination,  the  dominant  power  in  Europe, 
America  and  Asia — but  if  we  are  to  go  in  for  it, 
it  will  be  well  to  have  our  eyes  wide  open.  It 
will  not  be  popular  outside  its  own  member- 
ship. A  hostile  block  will  certainly  be  formed 
to  restore  the  Balance  of  Power. 


THE  INTERESTS  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS       89 

If,  on  the  whole,  it  is  a  very  good  thing  to 
have  the  non-Anglo-Saxon  Powers  well  repre- 
sented at  this  Conference,  it  also  presents  a 
grave  danger.  The  old  traditional  diplomacy  of 
bargaining  and  intrigue  has  a  much  more  stub- 
born hold  on  the  Continental  mind  than  it  has 
on  us.  A  narrow  Nationalism,  running  counter 
not  only  to  the  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  but 
also  to  any  international  faith  or  cooperation,  is 
rampant.  This  is  dishearteningly  apparent  in 
the  French  press.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  oc- 
curred to  their  editors  that  our  Government  could 
be  moved  by  a  sincere  desire  to  find  a  basis  for 
conciliation  in  summoning  this  Conference.  Their 
general  interpretation  of  our  position  is  that,  in 
the  face  of  an  inevitable  and  imminent  conflict 
with  Japan,  we  are  in  the  market  for  allies.  An 
article  by  a  former  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
is  amusingly  frank  in  estimating  what  price 
France  should  charge  us  for  her  vote  against 
Japan. 

If  the  French  or  Italian  Delegation  should  be 
dominated  by  this  point  of  view  we  will  all  wish 
that  they  had  stayed  at  home.  Any  one  with 
the  laziness  of  mind  to  think  that  war  is  inevit- 
able will  be  a  dead  weight  at  this  Conference. 

The  sharp  conflicts  of  interest,  the  crucial  is- 
sues before  the  Conference,  are  triangular.  They 
lie  between   Britain,  America  and  Japan.     In 


90  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

most  of  the  areas  of  danger,  France  and  Italy- 
are  relatively  neutral.  And  therein  lies  their 
opportunity  to  play  a  beneficent  role  at  Washing- 
ton. As  concihators,  largely  disinterested  in  the 
detail  frictions,  by  real  cooperation  in  the  cause 
of  Peace,  they  may  justify  Mr.  Hughes  in  hav- 
ing invited  them.     If  they  act  in  this  spirit  we 

will  all  be  glad  they  came. 

*        *        * 

There  is  one  question  of  very  vivid  interest 
to  these  European  Powers,  which,  while  it  may 
never  get  on  the  formal  Agenda,  is  sure  to  be 
discussed  informally,  and  that  is  finance.  There 
was  even  some  talk  in  Europe  of  an  International 
Financial  Conference  to  sit  at  the  same  time  as 
the  other  one.  But  that  suggestion  was  frowned 
upon  in  Washington.  The  financial  distress  is, 
however,  so  acute  in  Europe,  and  they  are  in  the 
habit  of  thinking  us  so  prosperous,  that  it  is  al- 
most certain  that  this  will  be  a  greater  preoc- 
cupation in  the  minds  of  most  of  the  European 
delegates  than  Naval  Rivalry  or  Far  Eastern 
problems.  They  will  be  more  interested  in  Mr. 
Mellon's  proposals  for  handling  the  Allied  Debt 
than  in  Mr.  Hughes'  plans  for  China. 

The  greatest  impediment  to  the  establishment 
of  an  International  Equilibrium  today  is  the  num- 
ber of  those  who  are  absent  at  roll  call.  The 
League  of  Nations  limps,  one  can  almost  say 


THE  INTERESTS  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS       9 1 

Staggers,  because  three  great  nations — Germany, 
Russia  and  the  United  States — are  not  present. 
Adjustment  of  differences  in  the  Far  East  will 
be  rendered  more  difficult  because  of  the  weak- 
ness of  China.  She  will  attend  this  Conference 
as  a  Minor.     But  Russia's  chair  will  be  vacant. 

Who  can  pretend  to  say  what  are  vital  inter- 
ests for  Russia  in  the  Pacific?  Besides  all  the 
inevitable  uncertainties  of  the  future  there  are 
the  manifold  uncertainties  of  the  present. 

Russia's  hold  on  Siberia  has  never  been  truly 
consolidated.  Nuclei  of  Russian  colonists  on  the 
river  routes  of  Central  and  Western  Siberia  have, 
in  the  last  generation,  grown  into  great  cities. 
But  the  population  everywhere  is  sparse  and  the 
indigenous  tribes  are  not  Slav.  East  of  Lake 
Baikal  there  has  never  been  any  large  Russian 
civilian  settlements.  Vladivostok  was  a  great 
fortress,  in  the  days  before  the  War  it  had  a  large 
garrison,  but  most  of  the  civilians  were  railroad 
officials  or  parasitic  on  the  troops. 

Not  long  ago,  before  the  Japanese  War,  Russia 
had  a  similar  position  in  Manchuria.  They  had 
built  the  railroads,  garrisoned  the  large  towns 
and  begun  the  development  of  industrial  enter- 
prise. But  you  have  to  strain  your  eyes  today, 
along  the  South  Manchurian  Railway,  in  Dairen 
or  Port  Arthur,  to  see  any  signs  of  this  Russian 
control.    It  had  no  deep  roots. 

When  Russia  begins  her  convalescence,  it  will 


92  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

start  in  all  probability  in  the  old  centers  of 
national  life — in  European  Muscovy.  No  one 
knows  how  long  it  will  take  the  forces  of  reor- 
ganization to  reach  out  to  the  periphery.  If,  as 
has  been  promised,  Russia  is  to  find  more  easy 
outlets  to  the  warm  seas  of  the  West  through 
the  Dardanelles  and  the  ports  of  the  Baltic,  the 
basic  motive  for  her  push  towards  the  East  will 
be  lacking.  It  is  a  reckless  prophet  who  will  pre- 
tend to  say  when  Russia  will  again  be  a  Great 
Power  with  'Vital  interests"  on  the  Pacific.  But 
it  is  just  as  foolhardy  to  prophesy  that  she  will 
not  soon  appear  as  a  factor  of  importance  in  the 
Far  East.  Her  frontier  with  China  is  the  longest 
in  the  world.  The  problems  of  the  present  are 
hard  enough  to  solve,  those  of  the  future  are  des- 
perately complicated  by  this  vacant  chair. 

At  the  Inter-Communications  Conference  in 
Washington  last  year,  the  center  of  the  stage 
was  held  by  the  controversy  over  the  disposition 
of  the  German  cables,  but  all  the  while  the  ex- 
perts were  at  work  on  technical  problems.  One 
of  them  was  the  allocation  of  the  different  wave 
lengths  for  radio  communications.  In  the  present 
state  of  the  science  there  are  not  enough  wave 
lengths  to  satisfy  all  the  governments,  so  there 
was  a  strong  temptation  to  divide  them  all  up 
among  the  five  Powers  represented  at  the  Con- 
ference —  America,   Britain,   France,   Italy  and 


THE  INTERESTS  OF  THE  OTHER  POWERS      93 

Japan.  It  took  a  deal  of  argument  to  persuade 
all  the  Powers,  none  of  whom  were  getting  all 
they  wanted,  to  scale  down  their  claims  so  as 
to  leave  a  margin  for  the  use  of  the  unrepre- 
sented, Germany  and  Russia.  But  that  was  the 
only  possible  way  to  deal  with  the  problem,  un- 
less we  wanted  all  the  schedules  upset  in  a  few 
years. 

It  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Problems.  Unless  Russia's  eventual  interests  in 
the  Pacific  are  safeguarded,  all  the  nice  plans 
the  Conference  may  make  are  very  likely  to  be 
upset. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   THREE   ZONES    OF    CONFLICT 

A  SURVEY  of  what  the  various  nations  are  accus- 
tomed to  call  their  "vital  interests"  shows  three 
danger  zones,  where  these  interests  are  at  odds: 
(i)  Anglo-American  Naval  Competition,  (2) 
Trade  Rivalries  in  the  Far  East  and  (3)  the 
Fate  of  China.  There  will  doubtless  be  other 
disagreements  on  details,  but  if  the  Conference 
at  Washington  can  reach  agreements,  composing 
these  major  conflicts,  the  main  motives  for  Naval 
Competitions  will  fall  to  the  ground. 

Terrible  as  is  the  tax  on  this  now  poverty- 
stricken  world  of  the  preparations  for  war,  the 
expense  is  small  indeed  to  the  cost  of  actual  war 
— or  even  to  the  economic  loss  from  the  fear  of 
war.  The  depressing  thing  about  competition 
in  armaments  is  that  it  indicates  the  frame  of 
mind  which  makes  war  probable,  and  what  the 
shaken  fabric  of  our  civilization  needs  today- 
is  the  assurance  of  peace.  Without  it  there  can 
be  no  rebirth  of  credit,  no  rejuvenating  flow  of 
commerce  along  the  old  trade  routes,  no  prosper- 

94 


THE  THREE  ZONES  OF  CONFLICT  95 

ity.  All  agree  that  another  great  war  would 
wreck  us.  The  maintenance  of  threatening 
armaments,  postponing  any  reestablishment  of 
confidence,  will  be  just  as  disastrous.  If  the 
Great  Powers  which  have  been  called  to  this 
Conference  at  Washington  cannot  compose 
their  differences  and  begin  to  disarm,  the  stock 
of  our  civilization,  already  rather  below  par,  will 
slump  appallingly.  Failure  would  mean  not  only 
increased  budgets  for  armaments,  but  the 
strangling  of  all  enterprise  through  the  fear  of 
new  wars. 

No  one  of  these  major  problems  is  new;  they 
have  been  discussed  for  years.  So  it  is  not  prob- 
able that  any  strikingly  new  ideas  will  develop 
at  Washington.  The  Conference  will  choose  be- 
tween proposals  already  familiar. 
*         *         * 

The  first  Zone  of  Conflict  is  the  oldest.  For 
a  hundred  years  there  has  been  dispute  between 
this  country  and  Britain  about  the  control  of 
the  seas.  The  British  have  in  general  maintained 
that,  due  to  their  unique  island  position,  it  was 
a  vital  interest  to  them  to  hold  in  their  own  hands 
undisputed  naval  supremacy.  We  have  main- 
tained that  the  seas  are  a  common  heritage  of  ^^ 
all  the  world  and  that  their  control  should  be 
based  on  common  consent.  This  is  what  we 
have  meant  by  "The  Freedom  of  the  Seas,"  a 


96  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

freedom  under  Laws,  like  those  of  the  land,  de- 
riving their  authority  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed. 

The  British  came  very  close  to  our  point  of 
view  in  the  years  immediatel}'^  preceding  the  War. 
The  Declaration  of  London  was  the  first  serious 
attempt  to  draft  a  Code  of  Sea  Law,  which  would 
be  agreed  to  by  the  Maritime  Nations.  The 
experience  of  the  War  has  intensified  the  feel- 
ing on  both  sides  of  the  argument.  If  the  Declar- 
ation of  London  had  been  generally  accepted,  it 
would  to  a  certain  extent  have  hampered  the 
British  Navy  in  its  blockade  of  Germany,  on 
the  other  hand  it  would  also  have  hampered 
Germany  in  her  submarine  attack  on  the  British 
mercantile  marine.  And  merchantmen  are  just 
as  important  to  Britain  in  time  of  war  as  battle- 
cruisers. 

We  have  no  authoritative  statement  of  the 
British  attitude  today  towards  this  old  contro- 
versy. But  Sir  Edward  Grey,  while  he  was  still 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  promised  that  Great 
Britain  would  take  the  initiative  in  summoning 
a  Conference  of  Maritime  Nations  to  discuss  the 
Law  of  the  Seas  as  soon  as  the  War  was  over. 
Perhaps  an  agreement  along  these  lines  will  put 
an  end  to  this  over-old  dispute. 

During  the  Peace  Negotiations  at  Paris  this 
question  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  was  put  on 
the  shelf,  because  it  would  be  solved  automati- 


THE  THREE  ZONES  OF  CONFLICT  97 

cally  if  all  the  principal  maritime  nations  cooper- 
ated in  the  League  of  Nations. 

There  is  also  another  solution  of  the  problem 
proposed  by  Lloyd  George,  an  Anglo-American- 
Japanese  Alliance.  An  alliance  in  which  the  two 
fleets  were  pledged  to  act  as  a  unit  would  obvi- 
ously do  away  with  any  competition. 
*         *         * 

The  Trade  Rivalry  in  the  Far  East,  which  has 
taken  the  form  of  a  scramble  for  concessions  in 
China,  is  a  special  phase  of  a  larger  problem 
which  the  Professors  of  Economics  call  ''The 
Export  of  Capital"  and  Lenin  calls  "Capitalistic 
Imperialism." 

In  its  most  general  terms  the  problem  can  be 
stated  very  simply.  The  development  of  indus- 
trialism results  not  only  in  the  production  of 
commodities  in  surplus  over  the  consumptive 
power  of  the  home  market  and  so  pushes  com- 
merce out  into  an  export  trade;  it  also  produces 
a  surplus  of  capital  over  the  needs  of  the  domes- 
tic investment  market.  As  the  rate  of  interest 
falls  at  home,  when  supply  of  money  exceeds  de- 
mands, the  people  with  savings  begin  to  look 
abroad  for  investments.  The  highly  developed 
industrial  community  must  find  not  only  foreign 
markets  in  which  to  sell  its  commodities,  but  also 
foreign  investments   for  its  surplus  savings. 

A  classic  example  is  furnished  by  the  finan- 
cial relations  of  the  Old  World  and  the  New.  We 


98  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

held  a  land  of  vast  potentialities.  But  we  were 
poor  and  needed  capital  to  develop  our  resources. 
Our  railroad  expansion,  after  the  Civil  War,  was 
rendered  possible  by  the  surplus  savings  of 
Europe.  As  our  wealth  developed  we  were  pay- 
ing off  this  debt  easily.  The  War  hastened  the 
process  tremendously,  but  even  if  it  had  not  been 
for  the  War  we  would  probably  have  cleared  our 
books  within  this  decade  or  the  next. 

But  the  Exportation  of  Capital  from  the  more 
to  the  less  developed  countries  has  not  always 
had  so  beneficent  a  result.  Borrowing  is  very 
dangerous  if  you  are  weak  or  foolish.  The  for- 
eign capital  invested  in  America  went  into  wealth 
producing  enterprises,  which  were  more  than  able 
to  pay  regular  interest  and  sinking  fund.  Europe 
lent  money  to  the  Sultans  of  Turkey  and  Mo- 
rocco, to  the  Khedive  of  Egypt,  the  Shah  of  Per- 
sia, most  of  which  was  thrown  away  on  the 
ladies  of  the  Court. 

Perhaps  the  first  European  bankers  who  lent 
money  to  irresponsible  little  potentates  were  dis- 
appointed when  they  could  not  get  their  money 
back.  But  very  quickly  the  governments  which 
wished  to  extend  their  influence  over  backward 
native  states  began  to  encourage  such  reckless 
loans.  A  bad  debt  could  easily  be  turned  into  a 
political  lien,  a  good  pretext  for  annexation — or 
at  least  a  Protectorate. 


THE  THREE  ZONES  OF  CONFLICT  99 

That  is  the  danger  in  China.  Some  of  the  for- 
eign loans  have  been  sound  economic  investments. 
They  have  been  profitable  to  the  lenders  and 
have  largely  increased  the  v,^ealth  of  China.  Some 
loans,  made  in  good  faith,  have  been  grossly  mis- 
used by  corrupt  Chinese  officials.  And  some  of 
the  loans  have  been  made  with  bad  faith — in  the 
hope  of  political  rather  than  financial  profit. 

The  object  of  the  present  Four  Power  Con- 
sortium is  to  safeguard  both  China  and  the 
investors  from  unsound — politically  motived — 
finance.  Through  their  central  office  in  Pekin  the 
consolidated  bankers  of  the  Four  Powers  with 
Capital  to  export  will  be  able  to  study  every  pro- 
posal for  a  loan  on  its  financial  merits  and  super- 
vise its  investment.  The  danger  of  corruption 
and  waste — even  more  dangerous  to  China  than 
to  the  lenders — is  greatly  reduced. 

Perhaps  of  even  more  importance  than  the 
safeguarding  of  China  from  the  menace  of  pohti- 
cally-minded  high  finance,  the  Consortium  pro- 
posal is  worthy  of  note  as  a  means  of  associating 
together  in  a  large  cooperation  the  Four  Powers 
who  hitherto  have  done  business  in  China  on  the 
basis  of  cut-throat  competition.  It  is  by  the  de- 
velopment of  such  associated  endeavors,  far  more 
than  by  passing  Self-Denying  Acts,  that  the  hos- 
tilities of  trade  rivalry  may  be  reduced. 


100  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

I  There  remains  the  third  and  perhaps  the  most 
difficult  question  for  the  Conference  to  solve — 
The  Preservation  or  Partition  of  China.  It  is  of 
course  closely  interwoven  with  the  issue  of  trade 
rivalries,  but  there  is  a  pohtical  phase  of  the 
matter,  quite  distinct  from  economic  considera- 
tions. 

The  history  of  the  Sick  Man  of  Europe  gives 
us  a  good  example  of  how  not  to  treat  China.  For 
a  hundred  years  the  Concert  of  European  Powers 
tried  to  keep  Turkey  intact,  not  because  of  any 
care  for  the  interests  of  Turkey,  but  because 
there  was  such  acute  hostility  between  the  pos- 
sible heirs  that  war  was  almost  certain  when  the 
inheritance  came  to  be  divided.  No  one  wanted 
to  keep  the  Turk  alive  indefinitely;  they  simply 
wanted  to  defer  his  death  till  circumstances 
would  assure  them  a  larger  share  of  the  estate. 
The  result  of  this  policy  was  only  increasing 
jealousies  and  hate.  Any  attempt  to  preserve  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  in  a  similar  spirit 
will  be  a  bitter  farce.  Formal  homage  to  an  un- 
real sovereignty,  as  a  cover  to  such  political  and 
financial  chicanery  and  intrigue  as  that  of  the 
Great  Powers  in  Constantinople,  would  be  little 
better  than  a  frank  partition. 

The  fundamental  question  of  course  is  whether 
or  not  the  Chinese  have  the  energy  and  aptitude 
for  real  national  unity.     If  they  have  they  will 


THE  THREE  ZONES  OF  CONFLICT  lOI 

rise  triumphant  over  any  bad  decision  this  Con- 
ference at  Washington  may  make.  If  they  have 
not,  good  resolutions  passed  at  Washington  will 
be  scraps  of  paper, 

.'Britain  and  France,  while  not  announcing  any 
intentions  of  abandoning  their  present  estab- 
lishments on  Chinese  soil,  are  prepared  to  call  a 
halt,  and  give  China  not  only  a  fair  chance,  but 
also  a  helping  hand.  Japan's  attitude  is  more 
uncertain;  probably  because  her  national  mind 
is  not  made  up  one  way  or  the  other.  There  is 
one  group  which  holds  that  relations  between 
nations  must  be  those  of  the  hammer  and  the 
anvil,  and  is  grimly  resolved  to  give  blows  rather 
than  to  receive  them.  It  is  the  habit  of  thought 
which  ruled  at  Potsdam.  It  regards  every  pro- 
posal of  cooperation  as  a  crafty  trap.  It  cannot 
imagine  that  other  nations  can  embark  on  any 
enterprise  in  China  without  ulterior  and  sinister 
designs  against  the  prestige  and  power  of  Japan. 
It  is  quite  as  jumpy  about  missionaries  as  about 
traders.  The  prospects  of  Peace  in  the  Orient 
are  very  meager  if  this  clique  wins  to  power — 
and  they  were  undisputably  in  power  when  the 
Tv»^enty-one  Demands  were  made  on  China. 
^  But  there  is  in  Japan  another  element,  also 
sometimes  in  power,  which  sees  that  nothing 
could  be  more  valuable  for  Japan  than  real 
friendship  with  China  and  collaboration  with  the 


102  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Western  Powers.  Much  depends  on  the  outcome 
of  the  struggle  for  power  in  Japanese  politics  be- 
tween these  two  factions. 

It  would  seem  therefore  that  the  wise  strategy 
of  all  who  desire  peace  in  the  Far  East,  is  to 
strengthen  the  hands  of  the  Japanese  Liberals. 
In  order  to  win  and  hold  a  following  at  home, 
they  must  be  in  a  position  to  prove  that  Japan's 
interests  both  in  commerce  and  politics  are  safe- 
guarded in  their  hands.  Any  attempt  to  drive 
a  hard  bargain  with  Japan  at  Washington,  to 
push  her  into  an  uncomfortable  dilemma  between 
"isolation"  and  accepting  unfavorable  conditions, 
will  merely  cause  resentment  and  suspicion.  If 
the  Western  Powers  attempt  to  "isolate"  or  "en- 
circle" Japan  they  will  only  succeed  in  Prussian- 
izing her. 

By  generous  dealings  we  can  increase  the  num- 
ber of  Japanese  who  are  willing  to  cooperate  in 
the  Consortium,  and  who  see  in  international  as- 
sociation for  the  upbuilding  of  China  a  prospect 
of  enlarged  prosperity,  instead  of  a  menace. 


CHAPTER  XI 

WHAT  MAY  RESULT 

"Prophecy  is  the  least  excusable  form  of  human 
error"  and  any  attempt  at  precise  forecasts 
about  this  Conference  at  Washington  would  be 
absurd.  There  are,  however,  three  main  possi- 
bilities which — judging  from  the  pre-Conference 
discussion — may  result.  The  League  of  Nations. 
An  Anglo-American-Japanese  Alliance.     Failure. 

As  soon  as  any  one  of  these  possibilities  is 
stated  clearly  and  simply  it  becomes  improbable, 
for  as  a  rule  such  Conferences  do  not  arrive  at 
sharp  and  well-defined  conclusions.  The  great 
decisions  of  Politics  are  not  simple  enough  to 
happen  all  at  once. 

The  growing  realization  of  this  complexity  in 
the  relations  of  mankind  is  reflected  in  the  more 
modern  histories.  They  are  less  occupied  with 
dates  than  with  drifts.  It  is  possible  to  fix  the 
day  on  which  Charles  I.  lost  his  head,  but  every 
advance  in  modern  research  makes  it  more  dif- 
cult  to  set  a  date  for  the  Fall  of  Rome  —  the 
Eternal  City  crumbled  through  so  many  decades. 

103 


104  ^^^  ^  ^  ^'^  O^  DISARMAMENT 

When  did  the  Reformation  begin  or  the  French 
Revohition  end? 

Some  formal  documents,  which  we  all  can  read 
and  which  will  bear  dates,  will  doubtless  be  signed 
by  this  Conference,  but  they  will  not  be  nearly 
so  important  as  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  the 
delegates  will  go  home  and  report  to  their  people. 
Will  it  be  with  new  and  profounder  understand- 
ing of  each  other's  motives  and  interests — or  with 
deeper  and  more  dangerous  misunderstandings? 

The  future  historian,  looking  back  on  this  pe- 
riod, will  pay  small  heed  to  the  formal  documents. 
He  will  write  that,  in  the  second  decade  of  the 
2oth  Century,  a  trend  developed  becoming  more 
and  more  noticeable  after  the  Conference  at 
Washington,  which  brought  the  United  States 
into  the  League  of  Nations,  or  perhaps  that  a  drift 
set  strongly  against  any  universal  covenant  and 
that  a  struggle  for  power  developed  between  the 
Anglo-American- Japanese  group  on  the  one  hand, 
and  on  the  other  a  combination  of  Latin  and 
Slav  and  Teuton.  There  is  also  the  third  pos- 
sibility. He  may  write  that,  disappointed  by  the 
failure  of  the  Washington  Conference  to  reach 
any  reassuring  results,  the  American  people  lost 
all  confidence  in  International  Cooperation  and 
withdrew  into  an  Isolation,  which  they  could  only 
maintain  by  increased  armament. 

Recognizing  that  no  such  clear-cut  choice  of 


WHAT  MAY  RESULT  I05 

policy  is  likely  to  result  immediately  from  the 
Conference,  but  that  the  trend  of  the  next  few 
years  may  be  in  one  of  these  three  directions,  it 
will  make  the  issues  somewhat  clearer  to  con- 
sider them  in  greater  detail. 

*         *         * 

First  of  all,  it  is  a  matter  of  record  that  the 
American  Delegates  have  favored  the  League 
of  Nations.  Mr.  Lodge,  as  Chairman  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  was  re- 
sponsible for  drawing  up  the  Resolution  for  the 
Ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  with  a 
group  of  reservations,  which  bear  his  name. 
Evidently  he  was  not  at  that  time  opposed  to  the 
League  in  principle.  Senator  Underwood  voted 
for  the  ratification,  without  reservations.  Mr. 
Root  has  long  supported  the  idea  of  the  League, 
giving  especial  attention  to  the  International 
Court.  Mr.  Hughes  signed  the  Manifesto  of  the 
Pro-League  Republicans,  advising  the  electorate 
to  vote  for  Mr.  Harding,  as  the  surest 
getting  the  United  States  into  the  League^ 

It  is  not  impossible  that  this  Conference^ 
ing  in  Washington,  may  furnish  an  elei 
demonstration  of  the  benefits  we  would 
from  membership  in  the  League.  It  may  edu- 
cate the  Senate.  For  the  major  problems,  to  be 
threshed  out  before  the  Conference,  with  the  Sen- 
ate leaders  of  the  two  great  parties  sitting  at  the 


I06  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

Council  Table,  could  be  more  readily  and  more 
satisfactorily  settled  by  the  League,  under  uni- 
versal sanction,  than  by  agreements  between  a 
few  nations.  If  we  are  to  make  pledges  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  the  reduction  of  arma- 
ments in  the  Pacific,  we  will  have  to  "limit  the 
national  sovereignty"  and  "tie  the  hands  of 
Congress,"  just  as  much  as  if  the  subject  of  the 
accord  was  Trans-Atlantic.  If  we  can  safely 
enter  into  "entanglements"  to  preserve  "the  ter- 
ritorial integrity"  of  China,  the  teeth  are  pulled 
from  all  the  arguments  against  Article  X. 

It  is  an  innovation  in  the  practice  of  diplo- 
macy to  summon  a  great  International  Confer- 
ence in  order  to  educate  our  own  Senators,  but 
the  Premiers,  who  are  expected  to  attend,  would 
consider  their  time  well  spent  if  this  result  were 
attained.  Even  without  our  collaboration,  the 
rest  of  the  world  is  struggling  to  keep  the  League 
alive.  There  is  some  doubt  whether  it  can  ever 
function  adequately  without  us,  but  in  spite  of 
this  handicap  it  has  proved  its  usefulness  to 
Europe — especially  to  the  smaller  nations — and 
our  entrance  would  strengthen  it  greatly  and  give 
it  a  new  hope. 

An  influence,  urging  the  American  Delegation 
to  consider  the  League,  stronger  than  any  argu- 
ment by  its  supporters  at  home  or  from  abroad, 


WHAT  MAY  RESULT  IO7 

is  that  the  only  other  alternative,  so  far  sug- 
gested, which  offers  any  hope  of  a  noticeable  re- 
duction in  armaments,  is  the  proposal  of  Lloyd 
George  for  an  Anglo-American- Japanese  Alli- 
ance. 

This  offer  would  not  have  been  made,  if  the 
British  Government  had  not  been  compelled  to 
conclude  that  our  rejection  of  the  League  is  final. 
The  British  Commonwealth  would  prefer  the 
League  to  this  Triple  Alliance.  They  sent  Lord 
Grey,  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  League,  to  us 
as  Ambassador  in  the  hope  that  he  might  over- 
come our  objections.  They  have  made  every 
effort  in  their  power  to  meet  our  wishes  in  the 
matter.  But  after  the  speech  of  the  American 
Ambassador  at  the  dinner  of  the  Pilgrim  Society 
in  London,  the  British  cannot,  without  direct  in- 
sult to  him,  make  any  further  overtures  in  this 
sense.  They,  therefore,  must  seek  to  contrive 
some  other  method  of  meeting  the  manifold  and 
vexatious  problems  with  v/hich  our  weary,  per- 
plexed and  impoverished  generation  is  con- 
fronted. From  this  point  of  view — if  we  have 
definitely  made  up  our  minds  to  scrap  the  League 
— this  British  proposal  has  much  to  commend  it. 
It  is  admirably  thought  out  to  cover  all  the  ob- 
jects set  forth  in  Mr.  Hughes'  invitation  to  this 
Conference.  At  one  stroke  of  the  pen,  it  would 
remove  the  cause  for  all  naval  rivalry  between 


I08  TEE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

the  contracting  parties.  With  assured  command 
of  the  sea,  all  three  partners  would  be  safe  from 
invasion  and  the  defensive  land  armies  could  be 
reduced  to  a  police  minimum.  There  would  be 
no  call  for  large  armaments,  unless  the  Alliance 
embarked  on  a  policy  of  aggression.  In  the  Far 
East,  the  Alliance  would  probably  recognize  the 
preponderant  special  interests  of  Japan  in  East- 
ern Asia,  but  maintain  the  present  frontiers  of 
China  and  Siberia.  Large  economic  opportuni- 
ties would  be  assured  to  all  three.  Such  an  Al- 
liance, grouping  the  dominant  Powers  in  the  three 
Continents,  would  probably  assure  the  peace  of 
the  world  for  a  generation  or  more.  The  war- 
wrecked  countries  of  Europe  could  not  hope  to 
muster  strength  for  effective  opposition  for  many 
years. 

There  is  also  no  certainty  that  such  a  combi- 
nation would  prove  as  malevolent  as  those  coun- 
tries, which  were  not  included,  would  expect.  Per- 
haps a  generation  of  stabihty  is  all  the  race  needs 
to  conquer  its  more  greedy  and  arrogant  instincts. 
The  Peace  of  Rome,  in  spite  of  its  tyrannies  and 
extortions,  did  push  forward  the  cause  of  civi- 
lization. And  such  an  Alliance  might  develop  a 
more  enlightened  policy  than  that  of  the  Roman 
Caesars.  It  might  on  the  whole  deal  justly  with 
the  weak — the  Chinese  and  Siberians,  as  well  as 
Europeans.     It  might  from  time  to  time  admit 


WHAT  MAY  RESULT  IO9 

into  its  ranks  other,  equally  enlightened,  nations 
and  in  the  end  prove  to  have  been  the  first  stage 
in  the  development  of  a  Universal  Brotherhood 
of  Peace. 

However,  nobody  but  Britishers,  Americans 
and  Japanese  will  expect  it  to.  To  everybody 
else  it  will  look  like  a  new  scheme  for  world  dom- 
ination. Human  nature  in  the  past — even  in  the 
most  recent  past — has  never  been  able  to  resist 
the  intoxication  of  such  power. 

But  quite  aside  from  consideration  of  the  de- 
sirability of  such  an  AUiance,  our  Delegation  at 
Washington  will  be  preoccupied  with  the  question 
of  practical  Politics.    Could  they  put  it  across? 

We  have  quite  recently  given  the  world  a  sharp 
lesson  in  our  Constitutional  practice.  No  engage- 
ments signed  by  our  Plenipotentiaries — even  the 
most  august — are  worth  the  paper  they  are  writ- 
ten on,  unless  they  are  ratified  by  the  Senate. 
Other  nations  are  not  likely  to  take  so  important 
a  step  as  the  reduction  of  their  armaments  on  the 
mere  word  of  American  diplomats.  They  will 
want  to  see  the  bond  signed  and  sealed  by  our 
Elder  Statesmen. 

Even  if  Mr.  Hughes  decides  that  our  interests 
would  be  best  safeguarded  by  such  an  Alliance, 
there  is  large  doubt  of  his  ability  to  get  two- 
thirds  of  the  Senate  to  ratify  it.  Some  of  them 
would  oppose  a  treaty  with  Britain  or  Japan  if 


no  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

its  purpose  was  to  protect  the  Law  of  Gravitation 
from  the  wanton  aggressions  of  Mr.  Einstein.  It 
is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the  roars  of  outraged 
traditionaHsm  which  would  resound  in  the  Hall 
of  the  Senate,  if  a  Secretary  of  State  should  pre- 
sent such  a  proposal.  Are  "Our  Boys,"  yet 
unborn,  to  be  snatched  from  their  eventual  cradles 
to  fight  the  battles  of  Perfidious  Albion  or  the 
Oriental  Despot  of  Japan? 

Unless  our  Delegation  at  Washington  can  think 
out  some  new  combination  which  will  bring  about 
a  reduction  of  armaments,  they  will  have  to  take 
this  proposal  or  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  to  the 
Senate.  Of  the  two  difficulties,  the  League  seems 
the  lesser.  The  people  are  favorable  and  most 
of  the  Senators  have  already,  with  some  qualifi- 
cations, voted  for  it. 

The  only  other  alternative,  which  appears  from 
the  Pre-Conference  discussion,  is  blank  and  dis- 
mal failure.  To  consider  such  an  outcome  is  to 
reject  it  as  impossible.  It  would  be  too  great  a 
disaster  to  accept.  It  would  mean  frank  and 
open  hostility  with  the  British  Empire  and  an 
inevitable  intensification  of  naval  rivalry.  They 
have  urged — almost  begged — us  to  come  into  the 
League,  They  have  held  out  to  us  a  very  elabo- 
rate olive  branch  in  this  proposal  for  an  equal 
share  in  the  profits  of  ruling  the  world.     If  we 


WHA T  MAY  RESULT  III 

reject  both  of  their  offers  of  friendly  cooperation, 
making  no  satisfactory  counter-proposal,  they  can- 
not attribute  our  attitude  to  anything  but  ill-will. 
If  we  fail  to  reach  an  agreement  with  Japan,  it  is 
equally  certain  that  intensified  jealousies  and  an- 
tagonisms will  result.  Failure  means  sullen  and 
suspected  Isolation  for  us — and  more  armaments. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  country  demands 
results.  Even  if  we  did  not  have  confidence  in 
the  sincerity  of  Mr.  Hughes'  desire  to  have  our 
country  lead  in  the  cause  of  peace  and  civiliza- 
tion, we  can  find  some  comfort  in  the  fact  that 
from  even  the  pettiest  of  partisan  motives  this 
Administration  will  use  all  ingenuity  to  achieve 
a  resounding  success.  But  if  they  fail  what 
course  is  left  open  to  them  except  an  appeal  to 
the  grossest  passions?  If  they  fail,  they  will  in 
self-justification  put  the  blame  on  the  others.  We 
will  be  told  that  their  noble  intentions  were 
thwarted  by  the  evil  ambitions  of  these  foreign- 
ers, that  while  we  are  an  enhghtened,  sensible 
people,  who  desire  only  peace,  the  others  cannot 
understand  any  argument  but  force  and  that  we 
must  arm  to  the  teeth.  I  cannot  see  anything 
but  despair  if  this  Conference  should  break  up 

in  discord. 

*         *         * 

But  Conferences  rarely  reach  such  clear-cut 
decisions.    The  League,  The  Alliance,  Failure — 


112  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

all  three  are  possibilities.  But  nothing  is  more 
improbable  than  that  the  choice  between  these 
possibilities  will  be  immediately  obvious. 

We  are  much  more  likely  to  straddle  and  post- 
pone. We  may  make  a  few  uncertain  steps  in 
the  direction  of  the  League;  arrange  for  an  In- 
ternational Naval  Conference  to  codify  the  Law 
of  the  Seas;  give  new  encouragement  to  the  Con- 
sortium; reaffirm  the  policy  of  the  Open  Door 
in  China,  with  some  reference  to  the  special  soli- 
darity of  interests  of  Britain,  Japan  and  America 
in  the  Far  East — with  the  question  of  Japan's 
policy  towards  China  postponed  for  future  con- 
sideration— and  some  not  very  sweeping  arrange- 
ment for  the  gradual  reduction  of  Naval  Arma- 
ments. Even  if  no  more  than  this  is  recorded 
in  the  documents  signed  and  published,  we  may 
hope  for  a  real  and  more  important  gain  in  mu- 
tual confidence — a  result  which  may  not  be  im- 
mediately visible,  but  which,  from  year  to  year, 
will  bear  fruit  in  smaller  military  appropriations. 

The  Conference,  with  the  best  will  in  the 
world,  can  do  little  more  than  register  the 
present  sentiment  of  the  participating  nations. 
Its  main  importance  will  be  the  indications  it  gives 
of  the  trend  of  our  Times. 


CHAPTER  XII 

DIPLOMACY  AND  PUBLIC   OPINION 

A  BLACK  shadow  sometimes  falls  on  discussions 
of  this  Conference  at  Washington — as  the  shadow 
of  a  soaring  hawk  disturbs  the  farmyard.  It  is 
the  fear  that  some  of  the  diplomats,  in  spite  of 
their  public  assurances,  may  be  secretly  harboring 
aggressive  designs.  All  talk  of  the  reduction  of 
armaments  is  futile  if  any  nation  is  suspected  of 
planning  foreign  conquests,  for  the  people  who 
think  themselves  threatened  will  arm.  And  the 
life  of  the  world  is  now  so  inexorably  interwoven 
that  a  menace  to  one  is  a  menace — and  an  excuse 
for  armaments — to  all. 

In  the  general  collapse  of  our  hopes  for  a  re- 
generated world  after  the  War,  we  run  the  risk 
of  exaggerated  discouragement  and  a  failure  to 
realize  the  progress  the  world  has  in  fact  made. 
A  century  ago  such  a  conference  as  this  would 
have  been  dominated  by  le  secret  du  roi.  Kings, 
big  and  little,  were  not  in  any  degree  responsible 
to  the  people;  they  could  play  with  their  little 
family  combinations  and  personal  ambitions  and 

113 


114  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

no  one  could  call  them  to  account.  Today,  no 
diplomat  dares  to  take  a  strong  stand  on  any 
point,  unless  he  is  convinced  that  he  will  have 
popular  support  at  home.  And  public  opinion 
can  be  formulated  only  by  public  discussion. 
Everybody  knows  that  our  Government  can  count 
on  united  approval  in  insisting  on  respect  for  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  so  we  all  know  that  Public 
Opinion  in  Japan  is  very  jealous  of  anything 
which  looks  like  an  attempt  of  a  foreign  Power 
to  establish  itself  close  at  hand  on  the  Asiatic 
mainland,  and  that  the  British  people  are  alert 
to  protect  their  vital  interests  on  the  seas.  But 
these  things  are  not  secret. 

Secrecy  in  diplomacy  is  being  overcome,  not  by 
the  pious  wishes  of  reformers  but  by  the  steady 
shift  of  power  from  the  small  governing  cliques 
of  the  last  century  to  ever  wider  circles  of  citizens. 
Democracy  is  not  discreet;  it  has  to  talk  over 
its  vital  affairs  in  public.  Every  Foreign  Office 
today  exerts  considerable  influence  on  the  press 
of  its  country  and  plays  an  important  role  in 
forming — sometimes  in  perverting — Public  Opin- 
ion, but  no  Foreign  Office  can  any  longer  ignore 
the  will  of  the  people  and — at  worst  they  can  out- 
wit it — therein  lies  a  great  revolution.  The 
democratization  of  Foreign  Affairs  is  still  far 
from  complete,  for  some  old-fashioned  diplomats 
are  still  recalcitrant.  But  the  catalogue  of  Foreign 


DIPLOMACY  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION  II5 

Ministers,  who  have  fallen  from  power  in  the  last 
dozen  years  because  they  refused  to  heed  the  vox 
populi,  is  impressive.  Diplomacy  becomes  more 
and  more  the  servant  of  democracy  and  thereby 
loses  its  secrecy. 

In  the  "Diplomatic  Correspondence"  of  a  half 
century  ago,  it  is  common  to  find  the  phrase: 
"My  Sovereign  insists";  today  it  is  more  common 
to  read:  "Public  opinion  in  my  country  is  dis- 
turbed." The  final  argument  between  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  and  M.  Briand  is:  "My  government  would 
fall."  Opinion  in  our  modern  democracies  is 
often  divided  and  rarely  entirely  clear,  but  a 
politician's  tenure  of  office  depends  on  his  ability 
to  appraise  it  correctly. 

So  there  is  somewhat  less  danger  than  formerly 
that  the  Washington  Conference  will  be  disturbed 
by  the  secret  designs  of  any  of  the  participants. 
No  Delegation  would  dare  to  wreck  the  Con- 
ference on  an  issue  which  was  not  popular  at 
home,  and  popularity  is  the  antithesis  of  secrecy. 
The  delegates  will  keep  in  close  touch  with  the 
homeland,  their  actions  will  always  be  influenced, 
often  entirely  controlled,  by  the  reports  which 
the  telegraph  brings  them  of  the  movements  of 

public  opinion  in  their  own  country. 

*         *         * 

However,  Public  Opinion  is  not  always  right — 
nor  is  it  always  pacific.    While  it  would  be  hard 


Il6  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

in  any  modern  country  to  work  up  sentiment  in 
favor  of  frankly  aggressive  policy,  the  Demos  is 
easily  frightened  and  can  be  stampeded  into  almost 
any  folly  in  the  name  of  self-defense.  Reports 
from  Europe  indicate  that  there  is  a  large  measure 
of  popular  support  for  military  programs,  which 
are  at  present  as  ruinous  as  they  are  fashionable. 
The  citizens  of  these  new  democracies  find  it 
quite  as  hard  to  sleep  soundly,  if  their  armies  are 
not  as  large  as  their  neighbor's,  as  was  the  case 
with  the  uneasy  heads  that  used  to  wear  crowns. 

Fortunately  the  tranquillity  of  our  American 
nights  is  not  troubled  by  the  fear  of  our  neighbors. 
We  are  not  as  hkely  to  wreck  the  chances  of  the 
Conference  from  fear  as  we  are  from  bumptious- 
ness. 

Not  long  ago,  an  eminent  Englishman,  who  is 
interested  in  an  Anglo-American  rapprochement, 
met  one  of  our  prominent  officials.  The  formali- 
ties of  introduction  were  hardly  over  when  the 
American  said:  "You  Englishmen  must  make  up 
your  minds  to  it.  We  are  going  to  build  the 
biggest  Navy  in  the  world."  The  Britisher,  try- 
ing to  be  conciliatory,  asked:  "Wouldn't  you  be 
content  with  a  Navy  as  big  as  any  other?" 

"No,"  the  American  replied.  "We  must  have 
the  biggest.  We  can  afford  it  and  we're  going  to 
have  it." 

Now,  this  American  did  not  have  any  aggres- 


Diplomacy  and  public  opinion       117 

sive  intentions  against  Great  Britain — he  was  just 

feeling  his  oats.     Unfortunately  a  great  many 

of  his  fellow  citizens  also  enjoy  the  feeling  of 

oats;    they  are  amused  by  reckless  talk — very 

many  more  than  would  follow  him  into  any  policy 

of  adventure.     But  bumptiousness  can  play  just 

as  much  havoc  with  the  work  of  conciHation  as 

plans  of  aggression. 

*         *         * 

If  we,  Americans,  wish  to  think  honestly  about 
this  problem  of  reducing  armaments,  we  must 
always  remember  that  we  are  setting  the  pace. 
As  far  as  Naval  Construction  goes,  Britain  and 
Japan  are  tagging  along,  trying — rather  breath- 
lessly— to  keep  up  with  us. 

Is  there  any  reason  for  us  to  build  so  big  a 
Navy,  except  that — by  skimping  on  schools  and 
sanitation  and  other  civilized  things — we  can 
afford  it? 

Our  vital  interests  in  regard  to  territorial 
defense  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are  not  even 
threatened.  The  lessons  of  this  last  War  are  too 
clear  to  be  misunderstood.  No  nation  or  group 
of  nations  is  going  to  attack  us  on  this  hemi- 
sphere. We  are  too  numerous;  our  land  is  too 
full  of  resources.  A  war  which  does  not  finish 
quickly  is  as  disastrous  to  the  victor  as  to  the 
vanquished,  and  no  one  could  hope  to  finish  us 
quickly.     Those  of  our   interests  which   lie  on 


Il8  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

this  side  of  the  world  are  unassailable.  Our 
homeland  is  not  vulnerable  to  any  known  weapon, 
and  as  for  the  hypothetical  weapons  of  a  vague 
future,  the  only  thing  certain  about  them  is  that 
they  would  render  the  ponderous  battleships  we 
are  now  building  obsolete  junk. 

The  only  rational  explanation  of  our  present 
Naval  Program  is  that  we  intend  to  insist  on  our 
rights  upon  the  seas  and  over-sep.  It  is  in 
defense  of  our  more  remote  interest^  Jjiat  we  are 
maintaining  so  costly  and  formidable  a  military 
establishment,  scaring  other  people  into  equally 

absurd  extravagance. 

*        *        * 

Increasing  our  Navy  does  not  decrease  the 
danger  of  unpleasant  friction  with  Great  Britain 
on  the  seas;  it  only  accentuates  the  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  settling  this  old  dispute  by  friendly 
negotiations.  We  are  more  likely  to  gain  our 
point  in  regard  to  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas  if  we 
do  not  incite  general  suspicion  that  we  ourselves 
are  ambitious  to  rule  the  waves.  It  was  that 
suspicion  which  vitiated  all  the  eloquence  of 
Germany  on  the  subject. 

Perhaps  we  could  outbuild  the  British  if  we 
set  ourselves  to  it,  but  that  is  the  opposite  direc- 
tion from  the  reduction  of  armaments.  If  we  can- 
not at  once  get  general  agreement  to  our  Code  of 
Sea  Law,  to  insure  the  Freedom  of  the  Seas,  we 


DIPLOMACY  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION  II9 

can  settle  the  whole  controversy  by  accepting  the 
invitation  of  Lloyd  George  to  come  into  an  Anglo- 
American-Japanese  Alliance.  The  most  direct 
way  to  end  rivalry  in  armaments  is  to  go  into 
the  League  of  Nations,  Meanwhile  every  ship  we 
lay  down  means  intensification  of  Naval  Com- 
petition. 

The  defense  of  our  immediate — and  even  pros- 
pective— trade  interests  in  the  Far  East  do  not 
warrant  the  appalling  naval  appropriations  we 
are  now  making.  The  hangovers  from  past  wars 
and  the  preparations  for  future  wars  are  now 
costing  us  considerably  more  than  80%  of  our 
National  Income.  The  profits  on  our  Oriental 
trade  are  certainly  never  going  to  approximate 
that  figure.  This  British  proposal  of  a  Triple 
Alliance  would  offer  better  protection  to  our  trade 
than  battleships,  and  would  also  be  very  much 
cheaper. 

But  commerce  is  not  our  sole  interest  in  the 
Far  East,  and  if  we  have  any  obligation  to  help 
China  through  this  distressful  period  of  reorgan- 
ization, we  must  admit  that  this  Triple  Alliance 
would  be  generally  considered  a  betrayal.  It  is 
rather  too  much  to  assume,  in  the  way  of  political 
self-denial,  that  such  a  combination  would  benefit 
China.  If  we  feel  that  we  should  protect  "the 
territorial  integrity  and  the  political  sovereignty 
of  China,"  there  is  no  argument  left  against  the 


120  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

much  discussed  Article  X  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League.  If  our  duty  towards  China  is  really 
our  prime  interest  in  the  Far  East,  we  could 
achieve  our  purpose  much  more  surely — and  at 
infinitely  less  expense — by  joining  and  strengthen- 
ing the  League,  which  has  already  given  China 
ample  guarantees,  than  by  taking  on  the  job 

single-handed. 

*         *         * 

There  is  a  large  possibility — I,  personally, 
believe  a  probability — that  our  Delegation  at  the 
Washington  Conference  will  be  able  to  bring  about 
a  notable  reduction  of  armaments  by  purely  diplo- 
matic negotiations.  But  the  process  could  be 
speeded  up  and  extended,  if  the  public  opinion  of 
the  nations  involved  is  outspoken  in  its  insistence. 
The  Negotiators  will  have  their  ears  on  the  tele- 
phone. If  the  people  of  the  various  lands  raise 
their  voices  they  will  be  heard. 

A  very  special  responsibility  rests  on  us  in  this 
country.  We  are  at  present  setting  the  pace  in 
Naval  construction.  If  we  are  really  in  earnest 
in  our  wish  to  reduce  Armaments,  the  obvious 
course  for  us  is  to  do  it.  The  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives is  more  immediately  amenable  to  public 
opinion  than  the  Senate  and  it  is  the  House  that 
votes  appropriations  and  has  the  power  to  cut 
them.  In  no  other  way  could  we  do  more  to 
encourage  the  democracies  of  the  other  countries 


DIPLOMACY  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION  121 

to  bring  pressure  on  their  delegates  than  if  we 
do  it  ourselves.  If,  in  the  midst  of  the  Negotia- 
tions at  Washington,  Congress,  under  the  push 
of  the  people  at  home,  should  cut  the  Naval 
Appropriation,  the  Negotiations  would  proceed 
much  more  rapidly  and  successfully. 

Few  Congressmen  would  be  adverse  to  making 
a  reputation  for  economy  these  days,  if  they  were 
encouraged  by  the  unmistakable  urging  of  their 
constituencies.  Unfortunately,  the  taxpayers, 
who  suffer  under  the  burden  of  armaments,  are 
not  so  articulate  as  the  small  minority  who  like 
them.  On  the  one  hand,  most  Congressmen  want 
to  be  reelected.  On  the  other  hand,  most  electors 
are  too  indifferent  to  write  their  wishes  down  on 
a  telegram  blank. 

If  the  good  old  English  word  "wicked"  means 
anything  at  all,  it  applies  to  those  influences  which 
in  the  present  tragic  situation  stand  in  the  way 
of  disarmament.  There  was  a  famous  Divine, 
who  used  often  to  quote  the  passage  from  the 
Scriptures:  "The  wicked  flee  when  no  man  pur- 
suetla."  "But,"  he  would  always  add,  "they  run 
much  faster  when  somebody's  after  them." 

If  we  leave  this  matter  to  our  diplomats,  they 
will  do  their  utmost  to  bring  about  a  limitation 
of  armaments.  The  country  rightly  has  confi- 
dence in  the  integrity,  energy  and  ability  of  Mr. 
Hughes.    If  we  slip  off  ail  the  responsibilities  on 


122  THE  A  B  C'S  OF  DISARMAMENT 

him  and  his  associates,  he  will  probably  be  able 
to  work  through  the  tangle  of  jealousies  and  dis- 
trusts to  an  increased  and  increasing  confidence 
which  will  make  possible  some  steps  towards 
reducing  armaments.  If  the  people  of  the  United 
States  really  have  the  Will  to  Peace,  if  they  will 
work  together  and  concentrate  their  energies  on 
this,  they  can  force  Congress  this  fall  to  make 
the  gesture  of  conciliation  by  cutting  the  Naval 
Appropriations — and  the  Conference  will  be  a 
sure  and  huge  success. 


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